

THE "OTHER" PREOBRAZHENSKY⁺
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INTRODUCTION: ANOTHER MAN - IN ANOTHER MANNER

Preobrazhensky No 2? Why, what was the No 1 like? And anyway, is anybody at the end of the 20th century interested in any picture drawn of Preobrazhensky? Is perhaps another opposition-inspired political heroic history resembling I. Deutscher's Trotsky trilogy, or S. Cohen's Bukharin biography in the way of preparation? Have we not witnessed enough glorification into prototypes of the actors of Soviet public life in the - heaven knows how many - years of the so-called twenties, a tiny bit of time by historical standards?

Anyway, what really matters has already been said by others. Who would risk the assertion that political and economic history has meted out unfair treatment to the main theoretical economists of the Trotskyist opposition? Well, in the course of time sovietology has painted several images of Preobrazhensky: presenting him first in the spirit of the IV. International as an anti-bureaucratic party leader and world revolutionary who criticized state capitalism, then portraying him as a pre-Stalinist superindustrializer in the light of the theory of economic growth and, finally, depicting him as the founder of the theory of unequal exchange by some leftist theoreticians of the developing world.¹ Not to mention the phantom haunting the official publications of Soviet history for more than half a century, a phantom that might be called the peasant-devouring Trotskyist beast upsetting the unity of the party.²

What non-Bolshevik economist of the twenties even with more original and lasting scientific achievements but of course with less political influence /and there were lots of them/ about whom so much has been written after his death? Why then increase the host of illusions surrounding the intellectual significance

of the socialist political economy of the age?

To make matters worse, this message dated "Hungary 1985" comes from a country whose permanent economic reform have, it appears, long discarded Preobrazhensky's archaic theorems on unequal exchange, or on the law of primitive socialist accumulation and put them into the never-existing museum of socialist economics.

Do not be afraid, good reader, these questions will be answered this time not by a well-choreographed neo-Trotskyist argumentation stating how glaringly topical are Preobrazhensky's strict theses even today /e.g./ about the anti-working-class character of the concessions made to the peasants or of the ban of factionalism within the party. Unfortunately, I do not intend either to offer the type of answer you might perhaps even more expect me to provide: the "Hungarian speciality" does not mean on my part the re-serving of socialist economic theory in a more or less openly admitted Bukharinite fashion, where the basic dishes would be a Lenin-Bukharin identification, a Bukharin-Preobrazhensky antagonism or a NEP-NEM /New Economic Policy - New Economic Mechanism/ parallelism.³

Thus neither rehabilitation, nor new, more refined attacks? Then it is surely a kind of positive-scientific aim, the ever justifiable intention of filling a gap that induces me to write a Preobrazhensky monograph, which is really lacking and to try to find my way through the thicket of conflicting images presented in existing literature. No doubt, especially after Cohen's imposing essay on Bukharin there is a sizeable gap in the imaginary bibliography of Sovietology, at the name of the alleged adversary, Preobrazhensky. Not to speak of the thousands of empty pages in the books on the history of socialist economic thought, a discipline which hardly exists even in name. Hence, there would be a great many sheets of

paper to write all over.

Yet my motives could nevertheless be considered roughly personal. This was the case, at least at the beginning. For to undertake this private detective work /what else could Soviet studies be called, especially in Eastern Europe?/, I was motivated primarily by my own intellectual failure to put Preobrazhensky's oeuvre into a pigeon-hole. Emotionally, for example, I have always been to say the least, ambivalent. The extreme rigidity, bordering upon aridity, of his way of thinking, his professorial mannerisms and, finally, his almost complete incapacity for self-mockery have filled me with an aversion against Preobrazhensky which remains to this day.

This aversion can hardly be suppressed by my respect for his clear power of mind, aptitude, for theoretical innovation, excellent polemic talent and surprisingly sovereign political behaviour.

From an intellectual point of view I proved a failure as I was unable to form a logical chain of the almost annual and, according to usual representation, radical changes in Preobrazhensky's life /financial expoert from CC-secretary, break-away from Bukharin, desertion from the opposition, intellectual "passive resistance", etc./ What is more, I could not, interpret reliably the intermediate shifts of roles between the two extremes the hyperactive party functionary in the Urals animated by Messianism at the end of the 1910s and the intimidated and apparently disillusioned planning expert of the Narkomsovkhоз in the mid-1930s/. I was fairly disturbed by the epithets attached to him⁴ /the democratic party secretary, the courageous opposition member, the faithful war communist, the radical industrializer, etc./, which very often turned out to be prejudiced. However, I recognized in the meantime that, given the usually inadequate treatment of historical sources,

it was impossible to get rid of these labels, which not infrequently paralyse research at the very outset. Consequently, I first had to read Preobrazhensky right through which - in view of the early Bolshevik scholar-journalist-politicians obsessive trust in the power of the written word - could not be done overnight.⁵

Then the sources thus disclosed mixed up everything completely. A new, another image of Preobrazhensky began slowly to take shape in which appeared, among other things, the features of the lobbying provincial party official, the agrarian expert, the "moderate" financial economist, the liberal manager of scientific institutions, the Soviet diplomat establishing international economic contacts, the editor of *Pravda* popularizing the New Economic Policy and the free-lance researcher in economics criticizing the first five-year plan. A new picture emerged which cannot be reconciled with the old one within the current trends of sovietology.⁶

More exactly with the old ones, although they repeat, in essence, practically up to the present day the politically inspired portrayal drawn by early Soviet party history, eliminating from it at most the shades of antipathy. Preobrazhensky appears in these portraits generally as a Trotskyite, whose theoretical disagreements follow his political conflicts; as a restless rebel, whose war-communist radicalism, anti-nepist outbursts and humiliating return into the world of Stalinist industrialization from the 1928-29 exile show the same theoretical-ideological attitude.⁷ In nearly all cases, emphasis is placed on clashes, actually on parallel conflicts in politics and theory. With the slight difference that Preobrazhensky kicks up a row now with the party's impersonal Leninist Central Committee /as in the official party history/, then personally with Bukharin /as in the more or less traditional, model-like

representations of sovietology/. But what should we do with Preobrazhensky's occasional "loyal" periods, "civilized" activities and theoretically non-heretical" manifestations?

In so far as we do not wish to content ourselves with the undemanding assertion that "Preobrazhensky was a very controversial personality", there is no choice but to rethink the established conceptual inventory, the analytical means and the explanatory schemes. And here the "Hungarian connection" was of use to me. Of course, not merely because in this part of the world we have sometimes had the opportunity to observe at very close quarters the intellectual development of CC secretaries who had lost their jobs. It is much more important in our case that the interpretations of the history of Soviet economy and economic thought by Hungarian reform theories expand luckily the scope of methodological problems which, paradoxically, are often similar in western Soviet studies and in official Soviet historiography.

The adherents of "reform economics" usually turn with an appreciable "NEPotism" towards the Soviet twenties in a manner reminiscent of those western colleagues who are opposed to the "totalitarian" school of sovietology, which traditionally ignores the NEP, the "liberal" wing of Bolshevism and the pre-Stalinist alternatives /and therefore remains in the trap of Stalinist party history./⁸ Both intellectual attempts have the same object: their common aim is to replace the primitively unilinear historical and sociological model of Bolshevism by a social pattern potentially containing several development alternatives including even pluralistic economic and political systems. Their ideological environments are also interrelated: détente, convergence, faith in the "reformability" of really existing socialism.

The emphases of historical analysis have also shifted

sideways, from continuity to system changes, from theoretical convergence to debates, from political unity to factionalism from a totalitarian framework to a pluralistic-oligarchical one. But reformist thinking - although it can hardly be condemned for the necessary self-defence - stretches this correction of stress to the utmost /at least in matters of the economy/. It regards NEP as a rationally operating and well constructed regulated market economy necessarily replacing war communism, and tends to describe the proliferating discussions in the economic theory of the twenties preferably in a dichotomic breakdown, simply as debates on economic mechanisms.⁹

It is in this way that Preobrazhensky becomes the chief theoretician of war communism, an NEP-hater, a forerunner of direct centralized planning and moreover, the prophet of collectivization and large-scale "heavy-industrialization" - Evgenii the Terrible. The whole historical burden that was imposed in the totalitarian explanation on all Bolshevik thinkers is laid now on him with the difference that this time the usual ovation for his democratic behaviour is more or less denied.

In order to question this characterization, the elements of historical continuity and theoretical concensus which have often been discredited in the past, ought to be rehabilitated at certain points, and only at these points. If you, good reader, were afraid that this readjustment would lead to a return to an already outdated and simplified one-dimensional concept of Bolshevism I would call your attention to those assertions about Preobrazhensky, - to be criticized below - which have been made by the representatives of both the "orthodox" /totalitarian/ and the "neologian" /pluralistic-liberal/ wings of sovietology, and, furthermore, in close accord with the

Stalinist party history. At the same time, it would not be fair to conceal /especially as it is indicated by the subtitle of the present study/ that this paper was conceived in the mood of the 1980s in Hungary, now less hopeful again but perhaps the most realistic mood in matters of reform history, as seen by a researcher interested in the history of economic thought.

What, then, most urgently needs correction? It would be perhaps the most important achievement if we could strengthen the diachronic nature of the survey of the post-1917 period. If the simultaneous exploration of economic, political, social and cultural history did not always result in maintaining the synchronic character of parallel but, with respect to depth and speed, different processes. If - to remain with our subject - continuity and intellectual consensus which undoubtedly appear in Bolshevik thinking in the field of general political, ideological and economic theory were not obscured by the variegation of subsequent economic systems, economic policies and political tactics, or by the conflicts inherent in their existing side-by-side. The trouble lies, therefore, not in singling out the elements of discontinuity and controversy in pre-Stalinist Soviet history, but in doing all this in each sphere at the same time, as if spell-bound by simultaneity.

Yet the diachronic separation of the processes may not stop at the borderline of the economy. Unless we transgress that line, we shall have to be satisfied in the future, too with ideal-typical constructions like war communism, NEP and Stalinist planned economy, which restrain rather than stimulate accurate analysis of economic history today. And what is, in our case even more painful, genetic research on the history of economic thought can be fitted into this pattern only by violating the empirical material. For thinking in the

framework of the Holy Trinity of war-communism-NEP-Stalinist planned economy one can be inclined 1/ to hold the subsequent systems to be of a compact nature and to draw caesure-like hard demarcation lines between them; 2/ to interpret the trinity as a cycle, in which we emphasize the identity of the first and the third element, or that of the second and the future fourth one /the post-Stalinist reform economy/; 3/ and, finally, to find the theoretical economist "responsible" for each type, and then his adversary too.

It is by a similar argumentation that Bukharin was given to Preobrazhensky as an inseparable opponent for good./If they had been able to foresee what an insurmountable graffiti covered wall posterity would build between them, they would certainly not have begun to lay its bricks in the mid-twenties./ Preobrazhensky particularly has been frozen in his anti-Bukharin role by grateful subsequent generations. Hence it is worthwhile to make attempts at a thaw first in this field.

When assigning the roles, it has become usual to distinguish their "nepist" and "anti-nepist" features according to their performance in the so-called industrialization debate of the twenties on a black and white basis. Let us also begin to characterize the "other" Preobrazhensky - in medias res - by the reappraisal of their discussion between 1924 and 1926 /by conjuring up the forgotten elements of the theoretical consensus/. Then we shall leave Bukharin alone, and make an attempt, in the second part of the study, to sketch out the portrait of the "young" Preobrazhensky of the civil war. Are the war-communist features really dominant in it or was "Evgennii" not so "Terrible" even at the very start of the story?

x x x

My dissertation follows Preobrazhensky's course of life and scholarly work in a chronological order. The present paper has been prepared not with a proportionate abridgement of the dissertation. Here I have rather tried to give a taste, in nearly the same volume, of my theoretical interpretation of Preobrazhansky's oeuvre and of the historical sources disclosed. /For lack of space, I give here only those references which contain bibliographical data./

I wish to express deep gratitude here first of all to the translator, Véges István and to Judy Batt, who commented on the text. I owe special thanks also to Lengyel Tatjána, who helped me prepare the manuscript of the bibliography and to Szabó Judit, who reproduced the photographs.

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
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BOUKHARINE & PRÉOBRAJENSKY

"...May I be forgiven the bitter truth of my words, such philistine thinking, such theoretical stupidity that... I involuntarily thought: Doesn't Comrade Bukharin keep, alongside his current official writings, a special diary for posterity, and in particular, hasn't he written in it: 'AU this is, of course, rubbish, but it was required for conjunctural reasons'?" /Preobrazhensky/10.

"Gracious God, this is a nightmare. Fortunately, the guild-like, trade-unionist theoretical system manifesting itself in comrade Preobrazhensky's study, is not based on actual practice. It is only a kind of individual theoretical wrench, which has - at least now - no credit among us." /Bukharin/11.

1. PREOBRAZHENSKY AND BUKHARIN: THE FORGOTTEN CONSENSUS

/An old debate on "The New Economics"/

Рис. Бор. Ефимова.

Дискуссионное.

Враги! Дали ли друг от друга
Их жаждла кроин отвела?
Давно ль они часы досуга,
Трапезу, мысли и дела
Делили дружно? Иные алобно
Врагам наследственным подобно...
А. Пушкин.



„Дискуссионная“ переработка известной дуэли...

Н. Бухарин.

Г. Зиновьев.

Г. Пятаков.

Е. Преображенский.

Could anybody have believed in 1920, when reading the prophetic lines of Preobrazhensky's and Bukharin's first - and as it turned out later - last common work, The ABC of Communism,¹² that its authors would publicly bring such charges against one another? And could anybody knowing these charges have thought that a few years later, near the end of the NEP, the opposing parties would come again closer to one another in a number of vitally important questions of industrialization and collectivization? And it was absolutely impossible to foresee that the two Bolshevik theoreticians would meet again in a political revolving door in 1929, which would push them in opposite directions again for a short time: Preobrazhensky comes back, thanks to Stalin's temporary mercy, from his one-and-a-half years's exile, and Bukharin's fate is a state of excommunication mitigated by second-rate jobs.

But after the lapse of a few months, Preobrazhensky comes unexpectedly into disgrace again, and thus it will be possible for the official propaganda to show by their example - not without foundations - the inevitable meeting of the right and left wings in their struggle against the "generalnaia linia". Both become tolerated ministerial officials giving expert advice /in this capacity they make the only common journey abroad of their lives to the planning conference in Amsterdam in 1931/, both are allowed to deliver repentant speeches at the "Congress of Victors" in 1934 and work again together for a short while /not at Pravda, as between 1918 and 1924, but in the editorial office of Izvestia/. The expected new confrontation of Cyrill and Methodius /as the caricaturists of the Pravda represented the missionary co-authors of The ABC of Communism in the early twenties/ is no longer permitted by history. Maladjusted Preobrazhensky is unlikely to live to see the trial of disillusioned Bukharin in 1938.

Heavily framed as the story of their lives is, bearing the marks of a common fate, most biographies lay emphasis not on the perhaps uninteresting elements of their intellectual affinity as displayed between 1917 and 1923, and again between 1930 and 1937/38, but on their open combat in the much shorter intermediate period /primarily between 1924 and 1926/.

The story begins with the initial friendship of the two young Soviet-Russian politicians and social scientists, who still belonged in 1918 to the left-wing communist fraction in the Urals and Moscow. Then their ways parted and their relationship ended for a short time in mutual curses. This process provides a kind of model of the entire Soviet economic and political history of the 1920s. Quite a few attempts have already been made to use this tempting possibility by suggesting theoretical interpretations of the period, which concentrate on the most conspicuous dramatic elements.^{13.}

Most of these approaches, being products of changing ideological considerations, yet methodologically of a similar conflicting character, have proved of course extremely useful in the analysis of the economic history and, primarily of the political dynamics of the NEP period. At the same time, our understanding of the theoretical dimensions of the debates on economic policy or on ideological and political issues is greatly hampered if, by mixing up daily politics and economic policy with economic theory, we also search for conflicts where agreement is sufficiently obvious. /Even if we know that the intermingling of theory with policy is a favourite logical operation of the twenties./ Let us, however, consider the two-decade long history of the Preobrazhensky-Bukharin relationship as a whole, and we shall recognize

also their harmony in "Weltanschauung". We shall perceive an intellectual arch in both lives alike, which is based initially on the pillar of absolute faith and finally on that of total disappointment. Reconstructing this may promote not only the understanding of the more lasting changes in the forms of Bolshevik thought, but may also make us more suspicious of how decisive from theoretical aspects intermediate turn-about and conflicts were. Ought we perhaps to read the above quotations in the epigraph differently, interpreting first Preobrazhensky's reference to "conjunctural reasons" and Bukharin's one to "individual theoretical wrench"?

1.1. Continuity or change?

In the history of economic thought in my view, the demand to search for the theoretical similarity of Preobrazhensky, Bukharin or other thinkers of the age cannot be raised as long as we do not, at least experimentally, break away with the increasingly accepted way of representing Soviet economic history of the 1920s. A representation, which emphasizes discontinuity in nearly all fields of the economy. In the case of a temporary and partial acceptance of a "continuity hypothesis", however, we may again an alternative approach to the analysis of the NEP period and shall not be far away from assuming the participants' large-scale consensus in the theoretical debate concerned.

For if we regard NEP as primarily a tactical retreat, as a limited, fragmented and abortive liberalization experiment from the very outset, as a temporary action of Realpolitik turning in many respects even spontaneously into its opposite, and if we consider the original positions from

which this retreat took place as ideologically unchangeable /in accordance with the views generally held by the Bolsheviks/, then what requires an answer is practically, "only" the question when, where and how this retreat has to be finished. Thus, as to the initial and the final points of the process, there will be agreement in the theory, and differences will largely arise in tactical details, which are anyway hardly defined.

In other words, if we are sceptical about the existence of the NEP as a working socialist market-economy system, we can also doubt whether the NEP had a coherent socialist market theory, and whether there were, or could be genuine "liberal" ideologists among Bolsheviks; whether it is sure that, with the declaration of the NEP, really two separate path ways opened before Soviet economic thinking, as it is generally assumed, namely: one leading to regulated market economy /chosen by Bukharin/ and one going back to war communism /which is preferred by Preobrazhensky/.¹⁴.

1.2. Ideological and political similarities

The assumptions of theoretical consensus are not supported only by indirect arguments. The two Soviet theoreticians, fostered in the philosophical theory of the Second International, do not abandon the basic principles of their utopian "recipe-book", The ABC of Communism /1920/ throughout the 1920s. Likewise, they never reject the concept of communism leaning towards naturalism of The Economics of the Transition Period /Bukharin, 1920/¹⁵. and of the Paper Money in the Epoch of the Proletarian Dictatorship /Preobrazhensky, 1920/.¹⁶ Both of them pledge themselves consciously, not merely for tactical considerations, to Leninism.

Neither belongs to those economists who harbour a wild nostalgia towards War Communism. Both hold the Bolshevik take-over to be necessary and irreversible. They admit that, in view of general backwardness, some of the original positions must be temporarily abandoned. But certain, more or less similarly interpreted, communist achievements have to be preserved and the demand for a counterattack following the retreat as soon as possible must be maintained. Yet they are far from idealizing backwardness: industry is also for Bukharin the synonym of progress, and he does not even flirt with the well-known idea of avoiding, skipping capitalism through the obshchina.

They also agree that the building up of socialism is to be started in one country, which is only the other side of the thesis about the irreversibility of the revolution. The idea of Preobrazhensky, who usually believes in permanent revolution, about primitive socialist accumulation paradoxically provides a positive-optimistic programme exactly for this building process. And as regards Bukharin, he does not /cannot/ maintain either that it is possible to complete the construction of socialism in one country.

They consider economic measures of war communism to be ineffective only under the dire circumstances of the age, amidst war conditions, and regard their implementation in the past as an error, as necessary evil, or simply as an illusion. The retreat required by the NEP is at the same time the beginning of the transition period. Although the transition itself can be divided into stages in different ways it has a direction which is unambiguous. And, finally, the transition process is governed by well-definable laws. Safeguarding the so-called "commanding heights", permanent

socialization /nationalization, statisation and collectivization/, in short, uninterrupted advance towards the final aim is treated as an axiom. Similarly the superiority of the state sector /industry, large-scale production/, its non-commodity producing character and the determined defence of its intact nature are also irrevocable postulates. Preobrazhensky and Bukharin also hold common views when interpreting the dictatorship of the proletariat, the one-party system and the cultural revolution. Both condemn in similar terms the Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik groups, which demand direct democratic participation in economic and social management. They also deny the withering away of the state with the same arguments.

Thus, all of a sudden, the definitional labels become questionable labels, which first the debating parties stick on one another, which are then accentuated or further distorted by official party history, and which continue, to this day, to hold sway in most sovietological works. Right and left wings, agrarians and superindustrializers, neo-populists and new-liquidators, liberals and those demanding the dictatorship of industry, mechanists and dialecticians, geneticists and teleologists, adherents of the market and planners, followers, of the equilibrium school and radical disequilibrists - all these are twin-attributes. After having identified them, one is much relieved to read about the simple charge of Menshevism made by both parties against each other or about fascism, an attribute that Stalinist party history applies to them almost simultaneously with retroactive effect.¹⁷. Although these labels carry literally murderously differing meanings, it is by no means clear that they also designate contents radically different from a theoretical point of view, and can therefore be used as opposed pairs of concepts.

1.3. Unity in strategy - battle over tactics?

Will these labels still remain questionable also if, in analyzing the details of economic development, we proceed to discuss such issues as sectoral structure, rate of growth, volume of accumulation, redistribution of the national income, etc. /a few points where the views of the economists of the twenties clashed/? It might appear that consensus is confined to the general philosophical and political programme and the opposing labels gain their real meanings in the world of economics and economic policy.

Sovietological studies in economics have already long since provided similar answers when embedding the whole affair into the comprehensive model of "unity in strategy battle over tactics." ¹⁸ The followers of this view, however, have not sufficiently clarified what is to be understood in the given context by strategy and tactics. They mostly regard the first as something not worth studying, while they cram into the latter practically everything from considerations of value theory through the objectives of industrial development up to the minute details of price policy. Thus, the concept of consensus gets finally lost, and emphasis is placed on the widely interpreted conflicts. /True, the felicitous analogy, "storm in a teacup" ¹⁹. sometimes also emerges, indicating that the grandiose theoretical debate, translated into the language of practice, is often conducted around the problem of procuring a few tens of million roubles for investments, or around a price difference of a few per cent./

But is there really a storm raging in economic theory? To answer that question, it is expedient to separate theoretical economics from practical economic policy. One could,

of course, form an opinion of the opposing views on economic policy only by an immanent analysis of the debates based on the accurate knowledge of the economy of the Soviet twenties. Yet, theoretical parallels can perhaps be outlined also in a retrospective way, approaching the subject from outside.

So much can be seen at once, that the distances between the theories of Preobrazhensky and Bukharin /held to be huge in the NEP period/ dwindle in to insignificance in the light of what materializes subsequently. If we evaluate the polemic, in its entirety, extending over the 1920s, it will also become clear how "intimate" the relationship is between the two Bolshevik camps, even amidst the wildest storm of insults, compared to the coldly reserved behaviour mixed with suspicion and contempt, which both sides display towards their debating partners of a Menshevik, bourgeois or Populist past. /Towards those, let it be said, who could have taught them some lessons in economics/.

1.4. Convergence

To substantiate, however, a deeper relationship in economic theory, it appears to be necessary to go back to the history of the immediate events of the Preobrazhensky-Bukharin duel.²⁰ I would like to demonstrate that their polemic, though it is not concluded with a formal compromise, is nevertheless fairly convergent, and not only for tactical reasons. In order to render palpable the similarity, or the mutual rapprochement of the participants' theoretical views in the debate which lasts two full years, we must clear in retrospect the polemic - however unfeasible it might appear - of a few "disturbing" elements: of the personal drama

of the mutual hostility of the former political friends; of the inevitably overheated climate of public political struggle; and, finally, of the proliferating metaphorical formulations.

1.4.1. The personal conflict

Apparently, Bukharin is the attacking party, whereas in reality, he only defends himself. From the early performance of Bukharin, with his leanings, not, long before, towards Trotskyites and yet joining later the party centre, one can feel the guilty conscience. He overcompensates, works himself up into the debate, moving much below his own usual theoretical level, preaching rather drastically, *ex-cathedra*, to his former friend and co-author, while, full of prejudice, he defends the honour of the party's official policy.

Preobrazhensky is not idle either. As a genuine oppositionist he replies from the position of the oppressed: incessantly reminding his opponent of his political past and with professorial superiority demonstrating his opponent's intellectual stagnation. He reproaches Bukharin for his apologetic behaviour and condemns him for giving journalistic responses to his own scientific arguments and for tendentiously misunderstanding his ideas. The inverted fates /Preobrazhensky, ousted from political leadership and finding his home in research work, and Bukharin, increasingly engaging in direct political power and somewhat suspending his activity as the scholar of the party result from the outset in an unfavourable division of labour and vitiate their relations with controversies that may appear to be irreconcilable.

1.4.2. Political waves

This division of labour is at the same time a "job sharing" of the party centre and the opposition. Even the outbreak of the theoretical debate would be impossible to understand without the appearance of the first great wave of Trotskyite opposition, not to speak of the fact that the storm of the Preobrazhensky-Bukharin controversy does not really abate even after the subsequent creation of the possibility of a limited theoretical compromise. Bukharin is not far from the truth when he regards Preobrazhensky's fundamental law of accumulation, formulated in 1924,^{21.} as a theoretical sanctification of the 1923/24 Trotskyist slogan of the "dictatorship of industry". That is why, he publishes his response, in the party press /lifting out the debate from academic circles/ and not only because Preobrazhensky as a distinguished /and, in Trotsky's absence, often the principal/ representative of the opposition, often comes face to face with Bukharin also in political fora. Or because as a spokesman of the party centre, he is also directly assigned by it to start a debate with him.

The "sparring partners" exert the most brutal possible ideological critique against each other. Bukharin accuses Preobrazhensky of the defence of the particular interests of a clique aspiring to power and of groups of backward workers influenced by his "guild ideology", to use an expression of the time. At the same time Preobrazhensky describes Bukharin as "the ideologist of the reconstruction period". An ideologue, who, being a leading member of the Politbureau gives, under the pretext of representing general interest, an ideological guise to the 1924/25 turn of economic policy with its unprincipled concessions to the peasantry.^{22.}

The polemic loses some of its violence in the second half of 1925. The debate flares up again in 1926, which is unlikely to be sufficiently accounted for by the autonomous development of socialist economics. Of at least the same importance is the fact that, after the first successes of Bukharin's "liberal" economic policy which, for some time, took the wind out of the sail of the opposition, the ensuing difficulties - the grain crisis in 1925/26, the goods famine, the reclassification of the peasantry, etc. - offer new theoretical ammunition for Preobrazhensky in his attack against Bukharin.

And that its vehemence should not be mitigated, is ensured by the second great flare-up of the Trotskyist /now United/ Opposition around the middle of 1926. In such circumstances, Bukharin, even if he wanted to, could not regard their clash as a simple academic exchange of views. Hence, the debate is kept moving, among other things, by the repelling power of two subsequent waves. Of two waves, which threaten to break up the most precious Bolshevik value, party unity. This is the direct cause giving rise to the overheated climate of the polemic, to the exaggerated, artificially enlarged divergence of views.

1.4.3. Metaphors with many meanings

All that has been said about the tone of the polemic, also applies to the use of words. Since the "academic" dispute is carried out in political field, the debating partners take it for granted that their theoretical activities are, at the same time, agitation. And since this agitation takes place in the Soviet Union of the twenties, metaphorical language and political phrases with obscure theoretical messages, have a pronounced significance. In the context of

Preobrazhensky's imitation of Marx /the structure of The New Economics follows the pattern of Capital/, the analogy of primitive accumulation justly appears to be provocative, and the terms "exploitation" and "devouring" /pozhliranie/ of the private economy appear directly as an outrage to Bukharin, who chooses appeasement of the peasantry as a guide to everyday political action. It is of course equally shocking to Preobrazhensky and rousing him to battle when Bukharin turns to the peasants with the slogan "get rich", or when he says that the country should proceed towards socialism along the "co-operative highway" "at a snail's pace".²³

These metaphorical phrases, however irritating they might be, and however sharp the conflict of political and ideological views they might reflect, can be interpreted from theoretical aspects in a number of ways. On the one hand, the debating parties withdraw most of them in the meantime for tactical reasons /"exploitation", "get rich", etc./ and, on the other, they extend their meaning until they hardly differ from their partner's view /Preobrazhensky's maxims of "taking more from the still larger incomes", or "to pass as quickly as possible through the period of primitive socialist accumulation" can be good examples of that/. Similarly, the verbal conjuring tricks with the principle of "socialism in one country" and the so-called "third revolution" show how broadly these slogans can be interpreted. Not to speak of the boring controversies about the word combinations "New Economics" and "New Economic Policy"....²⁴.

1.4.4. The paths of convergence

If, in our minds, we relieve the polemic of the metaphorical exaggerations, the traditional conflict-based presen-

tation loses some of its validity, and the cohesive elements begin to come into prominence. Instead of the Preobrazhensky-Bukharin confrontation, generally held to be immobile one can observe two changing and interacting theoretical performances which, to a certain extent, come near to one another. Convergence can be observed on several planes.

Firstly, the opposing parties compel one another to examine their own positions thoroughly and to support them carefully. The abstract law-scholasticism of Preobrazhensky's first paper in the Communist Academy thus partly gives way, to a positive exposition in his second lecture,²⁵ on the law of value. It is also in this manner that Bukharin leaves the state of condemnatory refutation ^{FOR} fragmentary but positive assertions when, reacting to The New Economics, he formulates his own law of "proportional labour outlays".²⁶ A law, which supports theoretically the economic policy he has pursued so far. In the meantime, both of them prune their arguments giving rise to altercations, and, even if they do not come to an agreement, now they understand each other better.

Secondly, ^{by} repeatedly referring to formidable extremities /Menshevism, Populism, Smenavekhism/ they also force each other not to deviate, at least formally, from the Leninist line - as they interpret it /NEP, the peasant issue, cooperatives, etc./. No matter how violent the fight between them for the appropriation of Lenin's theoretical heritage is, it should not be forgotten that both of them have slipped out, if not of Gogol's, then of "Lenin's overcoat".

Thirdly - and this is perhaps of decisive importance - their rapprochement is also explained by a few very important new developments of economic life. The expected termination of the recovery period, and thereby the real emergence of the accumulation problem, as well as the simultaneous appearance of the goods famine compel Bukharin to re-evaluate the question of industrialization, which he has largely neglected. The same factors stimulate Preobrazhensky to explore the structural proportions and general equilibrium of the economy. Thus, the allegedly "neo-Populist" Bukharin brings forth important ideas about industrial development, and the allegedly "super-industrialist" Preobrazhensky unfolds anxieties about economic equilibrium.

And, fourthly, actual political considerations also dampen the mood of the debating parties. Preobrazhensky has anyway been condemned in the circles of Trotskyite Opposition for his "intellectual" outspokenness. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the period of the establishment of the Leningrad Opposition, of the compromise resolutions of the XIVth Congress and of the formation of the United Opposition, his fellow-oppositionists try to silence him. To keep him back in the interest of a "wait-and-see" policy and of a new alliance to be concluded with the earlier political opponents. /It is for this reason that Preobrazhensky abandons certain terms which he was criticised for using in his paper of 1924: "exploitation", "plundering", etc./ And as regards Bukharin, the attempt of the XIV. Congress to compromise /NEP, state capitalism, kulak question, industrial development, etc./ mutes his voice, too. In addition, the occasional floundering of the "liberal" economic policy associated with him, and the resulting diminution of his power are bound to produce similar consequences. The difference is - to put it simply - that it is not Trotsky, but Stalin who tries to put fetters on him. And when the political deba-

te flares up again after the middle of 1926, Bukharin no longer bothers to give his own views in the language of economic theory when reading the new chapters of Preobrazhensky's the "New Economics" published in the form of articles.

If we accept that the debate shows convergence over time, the question is still open: at what points of economic theory does mutual rapprochement take place? Here, from the point of view of our basic assumption, it may be instructive to look at those statements of either party usually neglected by specialists in the history of economic thought, to which the other party usually does not ascribe special importance. On the contrary, often accepts them with a condescending gesture /for example, assertions about the non-commodity-producing nature of the state sector or of the increased "siphoning off" of the growing incomes of the peasantry/. It is worth observing that the lower we descend into the rather ^{mixed up} levels of abstraction applied in the polemic, in the direction of actual economic policy, the less common is this friendly gesture and the tenser are the controversies.

Let us begin then "from above". I have already made mention of the philosophical parallels between Preobrazhensky and Bukharin in the general theory of the transition period. We can complement what has been outlined above by the following arguments.

1.5. Doctrine_and_scenario

The general ideological uncertainty following the "downfall" of War Communism does not mean at the same time - as we have seen - the lack of a doctrine of economic theory

relating to the transition period. What is lacking is not so much a generally accepted doctrine, but rather a uniform scenario of the transition. The debating parties are making efforts to elaborate the latter, by the more or less similar, but rather unconvincing application of the methodology of Marxian economics. Although it is Preobrazhensky who takes the lead in the fanatical search for the law/s/ governing the transition, Bukharin also, in the form of the law of proportionate labour outlays, finally accepts the existence of the principle underlying /directing/ the realization of the scenario.

True, Bukharin, when speaking of a "planned conscious law" presents its operation in a somewhat less fatalistic manner, while his opponent emphasizes the objective commands of the law of primitive socialist accumulation and calls on the economic leadership to obey them. It is also true that in his response, Bukharin, with some dialectical turns and twists, incorporates the state and its economic policy in the Marxian concept of "basis"?²⁷. All this does not exclude the cynical interpretation that the politician in power /"we are the law"/ does not wish to have his hands bound by the opposition's political and economic demands, which are forced upon him as a kind of law, in economics, and he tries to free his actions of any yardstick declared to be "objective".

With Preobrazhensky, two laws /regulators/ - the law of primitive accumulation and the law of value - are in an irreconcilable fight against each other, while with Bukharin this same contradiction appears as a non-antagonistic relationship of two principles /planning and spontaneity/ within one single law.²⁸ /Someties we find this in Preobrazhensky, too, only he gives a different name to this law./ Therefore,

it may appear that here the alternative of "confrontation against co-operation" is formulated. In the writings of Preobrazhensky the battle of the two laws finally leads to the overcoming and termination of the law of value, while with Bukharin we see instead of fighting rather compatibility and getting along. Yes, but there is the element of ousting, too, when - to put it in abstract Bukharinite terms - one law yields its validity, by way of evolution, to the other. Thus, what we can really witness in both cases is the traditional theory of the "expanding island", whether it is called rashly the "devouring" of pre-socialist forms /Preobrazhensky/, or more finely, the gaining ground of the proletarian "oasis" in the peasant "desert" /Bukharin/²⁹.

In addition, the debating parties combine their pessimistic and optimistic views at this point in a similar way. Experiencing the faster recovery of the private sector in the first years of the NEP, they unanimously come to the "pessimistic" conclusion that the state economy cannot thrive without special efforts at making use of the means of "monopolistic self-defence".³⁰ Any state of the economy approximating to laissez faire would mean not only putting the clock back with regard to the achievements of monopoly capitalism in economic organization, but would also necessarily lead to the defeat of socialist forms in the struggle of the two regulators /principles/. If, however, we insist on protectionism /which is in Preobrazhensky tantamount to strengthening the state sector by means of primitive accumulation so that it may reach, as soon as possible, the level where it can enforce its inherent advantages automatically/, then the state economy will be capable of expanding without limitations, and the scope of planning may expand incessantly - as they both think optimistically.

However emphatically Bukharin stresses the plan of gradual collectivization of the private peasant farms /using, in the case of nepmen an expression /vvzhit'/ which means both survival and chucking out/,³¹ he does not find a genuine opponent in Preobrazhensky who, for the lack of an actual peasant programme, avoids engaging in a debate, saying that what does not exist cannot constitute the subject of a scientific analysis.³² And as far as Bukharin is concerned, although his protectionism is not as persistent as that of his opponent, neither he denies /nor can he / the Leninist principle of "kto kogo" /Preobrazhensky's notion of the struggle of the two regulators is practically a paraphrase of that principle./

In 1922, Preobrazhensky publishes an early preparatory study of his later book still under the title From NEP to Socialism,³³ presuming that the real beginning of the transition period presupposes the transcending of the NEP. In The New Economics he already raises only terminological misgivings concerning the concept of the NEP. Thus, he does not come into collision with his partner, who in turn supports the slogan "with NEP to socialism" as a sequel to the idea of peasantry growing into socialism. Although Preobrazhensky inserts, by projecting primitive socialist accumulation, a new, preparatory stage into the initial phase of the transition period, he does not take a stand on the growing-in process. That is, on the question whether the preparatory stage will be concluded by the so-called "third revolution", following the February and the October ones.

All things considered, not only the doctrine relating to the transition process, but also the "director" /the directing law/ of the scenario envisaged by the two authors and the theoretical guidelines of the action sketched out in the scenario are very close to one another. Not to speak of the basic dichotomy of the actors' team. State economy

/primarily large-scale industry/, primitive accumulation, planning on the one hand; private peasant farming, law of value, spontaneity, on the other - this is Preobrazhensky's classification. Bukharin also sets up a dualistic model, but in his case, of course, no mention is made of primitive accumulation, and the law of value yields its place not to the law of socialist accumulation, but to the law of proportional labour outlays "unmasking its sinful value disguise".

1.6. Parallels of market mechanisms

From a theoretical point of view, dualistic fragmentation is in both cases disjunct, in the sense that the opposing parties derive the categories of commodity production unanimously from outside the state economy, from exchange between the two sectors. They hold that the infiltration of market elements /the inverted devouring-ousting process/ should be condemned and terminated. Bukharin has no khozrashchet theory either in the present-day sense of the socialist market economy, or in any other sense /the two principles are co-operating in his system outside the scope of the state economy/. Therefore, the consensus between the two parties in the matters of the mechanism - to use a current phrase - is quite profound as far as the internal relations of the socialist sector are concerned. And as to the relationship between the state and the private sector, it is Preobrazhensky who /unlike his opponent/, instead of making high-flying statements about reliance on the peasant market, begins to carry out a far-reaching structural analysis of exchange relations, indicating where he sees /and where not/ a real possibility of excluding the market, or where the laws of accumulation and of value are opposed, and where they work together.³⁴.

We might say that in his case all this serves mainly the aim of laying the foundations of his famous /or notorious theory of "unequal exchange" between industry and agriculture, that is, of the "exploitation" of the peasantry. But the principle of siphoning-off the incomes, is not denied by Bukharin either. On the contrary, he explicitly agrees with his opponent about the fairly ambiguous demand to take more of the growing incomes of the peasants. At the same time, Preobrazhensky also admits the political limits of income redistribution. In addition, he does not regard the siphoning-off of incomes as a one-way process, but as the first stage of redistribution /the advantage of which will also be enjoyed by the village, for example in the form of credits./^{35.}

By this, and by assuming the rise in peasant incomes, he tacitly approves of the basic Bukharinite principles of stimulating the peasantry. Preobrazhensky does not wish either to abolish the internal market at once, moreover, he appears to accept its expansion, while Bukharin's Dodonaic phrase about reliance on the peasant market by no means excludes Preobrazhensky's demand for the strengthening of state regulation of exchange between industry and agriculture. Consequently, the postulates of "exploitation through the market" /Preobrazhensky/ and "accumulation through circulation" /Bukharin/ are perhaps - at least at the level of theory - not very far from one another.^{36.}

1.7. Similarity in the theory of economic growth - - dissimilarity in evaluating the economic situation

The mechanisms of unequal exchange and of accumulation through circulation equally serve, in the last analysis, the aims of industrial development. The Preobrazhensky-Bukharin

polemic is usually called industrialization debate. In searching for theoretical divergences, let us also descend from the heights of value and market theories to that level. It will not be easy here either to "accuse" the opposing parties of being lagaged in a really theoretical dispute.

Their views about the general necessity of industrialization, or about the advantages of state-owned large-scale industry hardly have ever differed. What is more, it is exactly the subject of industrialization, where the rapprochement is the quickest. It may appear unbelievable but it is difficult to characterize Preobrazhensky in the 1924-26 debate ^{as} a theoretician unambiguously supporting the autarchic development of heavy industry. He mentions cursorily the thesis of the faster development of the capital goods sector, but in outlining the law of primitive socialist accumulation he speaks of syphoning-off incomes into industry in general, and not of pumping them into heavy industry in particular. He also seriously harbours the idea of importing fixed capital.³⁷. Bukharin will also "discover" the light industry only later, in the course of the preparation of the first five-year plan ³⁸ and now he has only little to say on the essence of that subject apart from the rejection of the "dictatorship of industry" and the single plan of the national economy.

But the debate unfolding around The New Economics is carried on first of all about the sources of industrialization and not about the methods of it. Preobrazhensky does not exclude theoretically the possibility that the internal accumulation of industry can be expanded. He even speaks openly of the self-restraint /"self-exploitation"/ to be undertaken by the proletariat in the interest of primitive

accumulation³⁹. and expects a reduction in the wage costs as a result of it. Bukharin's idea about decreasing wage-costs through acceleration of the circulation process is, in principle, not alien to him either. He simply holds that this accumulation process is not sufficiently fast and reliable.⁴⁰.

No doubt, if they had been asked between 1924 and 1926 to draw up the accumulation plan of industry, the index number given by Preobrazhensky would have definitely surpassed, if only to a diminishing extent, that of Bukharin. But does this enable us to assert that behind the regular differences experienced in practical economic policy, alternative standpoints in growth theory are at work? In my view, we can hardly do so. Both authors build their explanations basically on the simplest demand-supply chain relationships of the economy, and they differ mostly in deciding which link in the chain to choose first. From here on, the combining of the rest of the links is carried out by the same logic. Preobrazhensky and Bukharin assume /for the most part tacitly but to the same degree: 1./ the complete spin-off of market effects from one sector to another; 2./ the positive feedbacks of the development process; 3./ the unlimited nature of growth; and 4./ that it does not necessarily involve the diminishing of efficiency. /With respect to the first five-year plan both of them recognize rapidly how weak their assumptions were - this appears to be one of their greatest merits in socialist economics./⁴¹. Given free capacities in abundance, these assumptions, of course, cannot be regarded as absurd. And though it is Preobrazhensky who formulates the charge against Bukharin, he too is, in this sense, an "ideologue of the restoration period."⁴².

And the choice of what to prefer in economic policy, to increase industrial or agricultural supply, which link

of the chain to grasp, depends primarily on how they determine the initial economic situation. Preobrazhensky starts his train of thought by emphasizing the backwardness of industry, while Bukharin stresses the underdevelopment of agricultural commodity production. The former refers to the slower recovery of the industry /mainly heavy industry/, and the latter to the lessons of the scissors crisis of 1923/24.⁴³ As already mentioned, Bukharin, in view of the subsequent goods famine, revises this premise to a certain extent, while his opponent, with the pride of "I told you so" feels his own premise to be proved./ In his way, Preobrazhensky, too justifies his view by eliminating a large sectoral disproportion /the lagging behind of industry/ therefore he cannot be abstractly depicted either as an enemy to macro-economic equilibrium.

In the case of Bukharin, the stimulation of the commodity-production of the peasantry puts the engine of growth into motion, while in Preobrazhensky's view, agricultural purchasing power has already surpassed industrial supply. Therefore it is to be feared that, owing to the chronic shortage of goods he wants to buy, the peasant will leave the market. Stimulation is inconceivable without an appropriate counter-supply of industrial goods /to use his formulation: owing to the "inhibited reflex of the law of value", the distribution advantages enjoyed by the peasant will hardly lead in the foreseeable future to an increase in agricultural output/, thus the industrial supply has first to be raised.⁴⁴ Apparently, Preobrazhensky is not willing either to risk peasant economy turning subsistence farming, and /although his debating partner does not believe him/ he abandons the glorification of war communist inflation. /Did he ever glorify it? - See Chapter 2.3.5./ He criticizes Bukharin's policy of reducing the prices of industrial goods not for theoretical reasons

but mainly because he regards it ineffective, owing to the dominance of intermediary private trade. Bukharin is dissatisfied with the monopolistic practice of pricing in the state industry also not on principle, but rather on account of its degree.⁴⁵

All in all, even in this least abstract field of economic theory, in which growth theory is contiguous to the theory of economic policy and where scholarly considerations might clash directly, the debate can be translated rather easily into the question of practical economic policy, where it is necessary to intervene in a more or less similarly interpreted short-term "conjunctural" process in the interest of accelerating growth.

1.8. A la recherche d'une polémique...

All this is of course not intended to diminish the conflicts of the debating parties outside theory. Quite the contrary: while in the course of the polemic the ideological political and economic-political differences do not usually assume the character of real conflicts in theory, the theoretical divergences reflecting insignificant shifts of emphasis mostly conceal differences of vital importance in ideology, politics and economic policy. The internal structure and velocity of economic processes of a theoretically similar nature, the consistency of changes, the stability and load-bearing capacity of the system, etc. are obviously assessed by the representatives of power and of the opposition in different ways. The real situation is not one where Bukharin does not agree with Preobrazhensky's more radical ideas but rather where he does not yet, or no longer agrees with them.

True, Preobrazhensky would take amiss these words saying that it is not the speeding up of the transition

period proposed by him but Bukharin's "defeatist" solutions that threaten the "smychka" /the worker-peasant alliance/ his opponent is so much anxious about. He would emphasize that the friend and enemy image of the ideology represented by him does not differ from what Bukharin requires. And, what is even more important, he would also declare arrogantly, that his scientific works are concerned with theory and not with economic policy: he wishes to present an ideal state of affairs, and the discussion of ideological and political concessions needed for its implementation is the task of other fora.⁴⁶

Differences in practical economic programs of the two participants of the polemic are anyway hard to measure. The rather vague requirements /which, in addition, are often not their own, but are by one party imputed to the other/, such as slow or fast growth, low or high prices, minimal or maximal industrial profits, etc., would not say much to a practical economist even if they express differing intentions in the peculiar language of the time. Especially not if the means of implementation are also similar. To say nothing of the fact that at the end of the recovery period, when already the exact index numbers have to be given, the narrow scope for economic manoeuvres draws the opposing parties much closer to one another. /See, for example, the discussions around the "Control Figures"/.

Hence, is there not a storm in the teacup either? We should not go as far as that. On the contrary. It would be definitely misleading to forget about the differences, apparently negligible at first sight, in actual economic policy. Because we could hardly justify, exclusively by means of political and ideological analysis, why the theoretical differences, often of a "much ado about nothing" nature, have finally resulted in repeated dis-

ruptions of party unity with a lasting political crisis, or in economic decisions demanding millions of human lives.

A political-ideological explanation is needed, in my view, not instead of but alongside with an economic-political investigation. The reason for this is that even if we cannot exactly measure the differing views on practical economic policy, we might at least decode them. In other words, we should regard the differences in the objectives of economic policy as responses varying not so much in their theoretical as in political and ideological origin. As responses, which differ according to the attitudes of power and the opposition, respectively, to a number of economic and political crises in the Soviet twenties. Unless we put daily politics and ideology into brackets, together with economic practice, right at the start of the analysis, then perhaps the traditional conflict-oriented presentation of the period can be revived, be made more authentic. Namely by making use of it where we can find traces of real conflicts.

Thus, we may escape becoming the passive audience of what we could call the "theoretical theatre" of the 1920s. Because from the fact that a conflict is played by the actors on the stage of theory, preferably in the form of a drama, we need not necessarily conclude any more than that these are the dominant choreographic habits of that time.

In this connection, Preobrazhensky's words addressed to Bukharin might be a kind of warning /the following sentences could also have been, of course, formulated by Bukharin/ :

"When I, along with other comrades, was prosecuted in one of the trials for belonging to the Party, in 1910, and I pointed out to our counsel /the well-known Kerensky/ that his plan for the defence included a variant which departed from the truth even when it would be more advantageous for defence counsel simply to tell the truth, he answered me: We need to construct a variant of the defence which will be more easily grasped and which the judges will accept more readily, and not to complicate the structure of our defence with observations about what actually happened in particular cases.

Such are the rules of defence in the court. But such also are the rules of political attack. In this kind of attack it is not always necessary to say, and sometimes it is even quite necessary not to say, what actually is. It is important to create the variant of the charge which is most advantageous and at the same time the crudest and most easily to be stuffed into the reader's head. This rule of both juridical and political aesthetics Comrade Bukharin has evidently begun to master."⁴⁷

"Attempts to effect a general nationalization of the small houses as well as of the large ones... had as their only result that the nationalized houses large and small had no one to care for them properly; they fell into disrepair, and in many cases there was no one willing to live in them. On the other hand, feelings of animosity towards the Soviet Power were aroused among the owners of the small houses." /Preobrazhensky/ ⁴⁸

2. THE "YOUNG" PREOBRAZHENSKY: FROM "REGIONAL WAR COMMUNISM" TO "CENTRAL SOCIALISM"

If, leaving behind the few years of heated debates, we were to return in imagination back to the early twenties and then to proceed forward to the early thirties, in these periods we could easily experience, in addition to evidence of Preobrazhensky's and Bukharin's theoretical affinity, also instances proving the closest relationship of their views on matters of politics and economic policy. Even if Cyrill and Methodius divest themselves of their monk's frocks and change for a short time into Puskin's duellist heroes /see the caricatures of the time/, they will soon come closer again to one another, but this time already as rather reluctant soldiers of the army of Genghis Khan /as Bukharin calls Stalin/. They are deliberating, in a community of ideas, not only on the birth but also on the dying away of the New Economic Policy, and they come almost simultaneously to a well-considered acceptance of the introduction of the NEP in 1921/22 and then, as if nothing had happened in between, to a more or less vigorous criticism of its liquidation at the end of the decade.

But let us not go into further details of "consensus research" because it needs - as we have seen - also "another Bukharin" along with "the other Preobrazhensky." I don't want to abuse the reader's patience, therefore I remain loyal, in what follows, to the person of Preobrazhensky No 2. And I do this with the aim of adding new features to his portrait, which, as comes from the comparison with

Bukharin, was definitely "milder" than expected. Let us modify now the widespread view underlying even the most tolerant interpretations of Preobrazhensky, which maintain that the author's allegedly radical industrialization concept is supported by his theory of war communism, which he never rejected.⁴⁹

In so far as we, on the basis of what has been outlined above, do not take the "wild" roles traditionally assigned to Preobrazhensky quite seriously, then we can perform this task, with respect to the period before and after 1924-1926, in four steps:

1. First, if we examine his political career, practically undisclosed until now, which between 1917 and 1921 led him from the Urals to the post of CC secretary we can discern in his larger studies, written during the Civil War, not only the voice of maximalism urging on communism, but also the voice of Realpolitik especially in matters of agrarian policy. Therefore, however surprising it is - we may also entertain strong doubts about whether "young" Preobrazhensky /he was around 30 that time/ belonged to the most radical /or even typical/ theoreticians of war communism.

2. Secondly, we can present the author's almost completely unknown journalistic activity /partly as a financial expert/ between 1921 and 1923, and through it his large-scale work as an NEP propagandist, in order to modify the assertion that in this period, Preobrazhensky is exclusively orthodox critic of the Leninist concept of state capitalism and a champion of the romantic utopia of From NEP to Socialism. A thinker, who expects his prophecies predicted in his pamphlets on communism to materialize overnight. And who,

when the Kingdom of Heaven fails to come, starts a new theoretical work /The New Economics/ to sum up again, at a higher level, his old postulates.

3. Thirdly, we may meditate on the paradox of why Preobrazhensky's views on economic policy underwent a moderation at some points /or at least did not exhibit the expected degree of radicalization after his debate with Bukharin. Exactly at a time when the political climate around Trotskyist Opposition got hotter again in 1926/27. In this way, we may probably have a greater chance of solving the mystery of what exactly motivated the main theoretical economist of the opposition to break away from his exiled companions and to join forces with his hated political opponents.

4. And fourthly, we may also outline the portrait of "elderly" Preobrazhensky coming back into legality, but disillusioned at once in the new Stalinist world. Of the man who waged his little rear-guard fights with means more limited than before, to accomplish the task of the creation-restoration of a workable economy. What might be of some use to us is, above all, the Trotsky-Preobrazhensky correspondence /1928-29/, which has been only superficially analyzed by the relevant literature. Nor can we avoid re-reading, in a new light /assuming a theoretical resentment concealed in a kind of loyalty/, the author's works written in 1929-1936 on financial affairs, the world economy and planning, as well as some of his newspaper articles. /Being aware, of course, of the fact that the Preobrazhensky sources of the 1930s - also including works available in print - are very scarce, indirect and not very reliable./

In what follows I shall have - for lack of space - only the opportunity to make the reader little more acquainted with the "young" Preobrazhensky of the first period, perhaps the least discussed one of the above-mentioned stages of his life. I hope, nevertheless, that

the historical analysis below will not only support what has been set out about the Bukharin-Preobrazhensky debate, but will also provide sufficient basis for making the reader sceptical, at least in the case of Preobrazhensky, of the validity of the theoretical parallelism between war communism and Stalinism.

2.1. Between the Urals and Moscow: factionalism on the "mid-left"

"This is not me" - Preobrazhensky might angrily exclaim at seeing the portrait painted of him by posterity, from which he looks at us as the chief theoretician of war communism. But he himself is in no small measure also responsible for the fact that many regard him as "Evgenii the Terrible", especially if we also take his early activity into account. At first sight, it appears as if he enjoyed his roles of a blustering politician and of a regular devil of a theoretician.

He picks a quarrel with Stalin as early as the VI Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1917, when giving the future global secretary a supercilious talking-to in the debate on the stages of the revolution.⁵⁰ At the I and III Congresses of the Soviets, he incessantly provokes the representatives of the Provisional Government and of the left-wing parties⁵¹, and later, already as a "left communist", he behaves off-handedly towards the commissars of the Bolshevik government and speaks, rebuking even Lenin, of the dictatorship of "certain persons" in the party.⁵² In theoretical questions he comes into a close contact with the "omniscient" Moscovites looked upon as the young Titans of the party /Bukharin, Osinsky, Pyatakov, V.Smirnov, etc./, and in his great restlessness he cannot be said to be far from rejecting any career advantages of youthful radicalism.

He soon takes sides with Lenin, but when, early in 1918, the latter wants to put a brake on the revolutionary rush, he even runs ahead of him and joins the group of the "left communists" who were rejecting state-capitalism and urging a revolutionary war.

- A party functionary of the Urals /at that time one of the most radical regional organizations/, who puts on here the uniform of the political commissar of the Third Army in the battles against Kolchak and takes part later in the Sovietization of Bashkiria;⁵³

- an editor-journalist of Pravda, who attacks any sign of activity of the followers of the Constituent Assembly, of the representatives of the competitive parties or of the anarchist movement with the utmost hatred and from the position of power;⁵⁴

- Secretary of the Central Committee, during whose period of office the hierarchical leading apparatus of the party is built up with an unheard-of rapidity;⁵⁵

- a prominent orator of the "trade union debate", who, in the last minute, adopts Trotsky's étatist platform

- the party's young theoretical economist, who pathetically recommends to the printing press of the People's Commissariat of Finance his first large-scale financial study, which allegedly urges the introduction of a moneyless economy by the unleashing of inflation;⁵⁶

The above-listed of Preobrazhensky's characteristics appear more than enough for the historical analyst to construct the character-type of an uncompromising "Bolshevik of War Communism."

At the same time, the propounding of extremist views is, for a considerable time, - apart from the first half of 1918 - by no means a losing strategy within the party. Thus, Preobrazhensky's "war communism" could also simply

be considered as a more or less involuntary personal adaptation, as a necessary prerequisite for being admitted to the "dominant circles". Rising in the Bolshevik hierarchy, which he also manages to achieve with an alarming velocity, is at that time hardly conceivable without assuming the attitude of an inexorable revolutionary /especially if the Uralian organization is the "stepping stone"/, regardless of whether it is undertaken as a matter of faith as, probably, in the case of Preobrazhensky, or not.

It would make no difference at all if this pattern of behaviour were to last over whole pre-NEP period. But in the case of Preobrazhensky, we can hardly speak of more than a kind of a priori war communist behaviour in both theory and practice. Because after the "left communist" interlude we can only identify this pattern with certainty by the much cherished ideological final objectives, the political techniques and the intellectual externalities /language, mode of expression, choice of the subject/.

Preobrazhensky /as Bukharin, too/ awakes probably only after the failure of the leftist fraction to the recognition that what was directly desirable for his rise in the hierarchy a few months ago, will soon be too much to keep his position in it. As with so many of his comrades, with him, too, the solution to the crisis of conscience /"to organize a new party around the old conviction, or to create a new, compromise-based, conviction for the old party"/ is provided by the sudden outbreak of the Civil War. And this not only because of the enforced cohesion under the conditions of the "besieged fortress".

The Civil War is to impair Preobrazhensky's conceptual radicalism by much more significant concessions that. Partly by experiencing the "civil disobedience"

of the peasantry, who constitute the bulk of the Red Army, his desires to transform society diminish; partly by changing from a provincial leader into a central party bureaucrat, he is filled with a sense of responsibility for the whole nation; and, finally, his inclinations to Realpolitik are also strengthened by the fact that, having risen into the CC apparatus, he must, along with ideological and theoretical tasks, much more often intervene also in matters of economic management and harmonize the activities of bureaucratic organizations. Although the revolutionary will never become a real reformer, nevertheless the few months "ideological" period at the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918 will soon be replaced by an increasingly "administrative" stage in Preobrazhensky's pre-NEP activity.

The world of everyday life which often destroys his illusions, the "realism" of bureaucracy, does not of course completely destroy his faith. The age of ideology does not come to an end once for all for Preobrazhensky either. It is often only prolonged: the main function of Weltanschauung, withdrawn from daily practice back to the world of theory, will be again the maintenance of promising perspectives is his case, too. This circumstance easily misleads the outside observer wishing to interpret the vision of communism as a direct guide in actual daily practice, since in Preobrazhensky's theoretical works of allegedly "war communist character" the vision is preserved but its realisation is gradually postponed. But if we understand by war communism not simply the forced postponement of the final aim, but also a programme for constructing a current economic and social system then the model "Evgenii the Terrible" /which is prepared, as a rule, through projecting forward the past of October radicalism and through projecting backwards Preobrazhensky's Trotskyist future/ is unlikely to help us.

2.1.1. Innate radicalism?

It is, in my view, exclusively in the usual absense of historical sources that Preobrazhensky's behaviour after October can be comfortably explained, in personality terms, by his inherently extremist attitude, or by saying that he works himself up into a more and more radical position, for example, by making, we might say, a war communist virtue of the necessity of war. True, his inclination to theoretical over-generalizations and pathetic exaggerations hardly weakens up to the late twenties, but, with the exception of a few editorial articles inciting to enthusiasm, we can find in all his arguments along with images of a bright future, more and more references to grey everyday life and, what connects the two, to a realistic programme of socialist - not communist - transition. The clear-headed self-control (of a scientist's hair-splitting type) only rarely fails.

An original radicalism? Can we believe it of the East-Siberian politician, publishing in bourgeois papers during the war, who is an anti-social-chauvinist, but ready to cooperate peacefully, on a Zimmerwald basis, with Mensheviks and SRs even after the February revolution and generally supporting the Provisional Government⁵⁷? Or can we believe it of the future political commissar in the Urals, whom Béla Kun rebukes, amidst the battles of the Civil War, saying: if Soviet power also wins in Hungary, one would certainly not treat the enemy of the working class as leniently as Preobrazhensky and his comrades do Kolchak's soldiers?⁵⁸ Or even of the CC secretary being at variance between his "regional" and "central" self, who constantly complains of being inundated with files depressed by his inflated staff and, not unconnected with it, by his incapacity of decision-making?⁵⁹

Nor do the well-known and somewhat more sociologically inspired explanations provide a firmer basis to start from

than the psychological ones. Most of them hardly go beyond the simple formulae of "Bolshevism drunk with power and the victory gained in the Civil War", or of "the breed of young radicals".⁶⁰ Bolshevik maximalism at the turn of the years 1917 and 1918 would be of course hard to understand without taking into account the intoxicating impacts of the unexpectedly successful uprising, or the ideological demands of party policy, rejecting at the very outset all serious attempts at coalition. It is also true that the common intellectual endeavours ambitiously undertaken with Bukharin tempt him to exaggerate. But, in Preobrazhensky's case, we cannot even sufficiently account for the radicalism of these few months in this way, not to mention the Civil War period or the fact that with him, contrary to many of his comrades, the year 1920, that is, the year of victory, does not produce a new flare-up of the faith in War Communism, nourishing the illusion that "now the obstacles have been eliminated for ever."

2.1.2. Regional factionalism and/or "left communism."

Let us tell the story from its beginning, but now in more detail. The first serious changes in the way of thinking of the former exile Preobrazhensky, who in April 1917 was still peacefully cooperating with the Mensheviks and the SRs, manifest themselves at the summer meetings of the I Congress of the Soviets. As the spokesman, beside Kollontai and Stalin, of the national affairs of the Bolshevik fraction, he is an extremist supporter of self-determination and thus represents a standpoint opposing the Provisional Government in the debates on the Finnish and Ukrainian questions.⁶¹ It may be assumed that it is here that he first comes to feel the wind of great politics. No doubt, he is also entranced by the possibility, long awaited in the underground and now suddenly emerging, of performing joint actions with the élite of the party, but

in his soul he still remains for years /also/ a provincial functionary.

Because when he is fighting over matters of self-determination in the summer of 1917, he merely reiterates those autonomist principles, in another context, which in the spring he used in his agitation against the abuses of the special government emissaries sent to Siberia at the Soviet conferences in Chita and Irkutsk, or which he used to argue against the amalgamation of the East-Siberian and Far-Eastern Soviets.⁶²

Moreover, he takes sides already at the I Congress of the Soviets not only with supporters of national self-determination, but also joins battle for regional /i.e. Uralian independence.⁶³ Later, from the autumn of 1917 until the spring of 1918, the same considerations will re-appear when Preobrazhensky, already as a "true-born" cadre of the Urals, tries to defend local independence of his party and Soviet organizations.

And here we have come to the essence of the matter. In my view, it is the "sound" demand for decentralization of the Urals and of the region's Bolshevik organization, without which it would hardly be possible to give a valid explanation, including Preobrazhensky's role of a "left communist", for the causes of his revolutionary fervour. On my part, I would look for the origin of his initial maximalism in his "geographical presence" rather than in his ideological past.

At the VI Congress in July-August 1917 he still criticizes Stalin, who represents the then still heretical principle of the victory of socialist revolution in one country.⁶⁴ Thus, while Preobrazhensky, being afraid of a counter-revolutionary action, fights in the capital, on an orthodox basis, against political adventurism accelerating the revolution in Russia, at home, in the Urals, many of the decisions following the October uprising are realized under his guidance. Consequently, his radicalism can also

be regarded as an apology: as a "just" self-defence of a regional party organization rushing forward in relation to the others /and not only against the Provisional Government, but also against the moderate majority of Bolshevik party leadership./ Because the Uralian "left communists" more or less also achieve all that their young allies in Moscow were only talking of.

And what is perhaps even more important, necessary self-defence finds ideological support in decentralist thinking. In decentralism, which in the ambiguous Leninist model of "democratic centralism in a commune-state" concentrates on the second element and which, as such, can hardly be regarded as a forerunner of the centralizing-totalitarian principles of the subsequent theory of war communism. Preobrazhensky - as we shall see - will not be bale even at the pinnacle of his career as CC secretary, to discard some of his respect for organizational pluralism, i.e. for centrifugal movements within the party and the state. /Hence his "democratism", much talked of in Trotskyite literature, which - needless to say - does not apply to the other parties, nor does it bring into question the leading role of the Bolsheviks in the party-state relationship./

Incidentally, Preobrazhensky is not the fieriest possible "left communist" either. Whether we regard his votes cast at the exclusive debate on the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in January 1918 in the Central Committee, or his declaration in May demanding the convening of an extraordinary party congress, or his articles written at this time in Pravda or Uralskii Rabochii, either we sense a kind of uncertainty in principles in his formulations, or the "sacred" principles are polluted by the practicism of regional lobbying.⁶⁵

He finds, in general, the conclusion of a peace treaty between a socialist and an imperialist state conceivable does not suggest the interruption of peace negotiations,

and, what is more, he is also able to accept a peace treaty with German annexation, not to speak of economic contracts to be made with imperialist states. And when he warns of the need to protect the achievements of October against the policy of "central Soviet power" /to use his words/⁶⁶, he stresses the opposition to the centre of the Uralian party organization /representing, with regard to its membership, the largest and strategically the most defensible industrial area of the time/ with at least the same emphasis as the defence of the achievements of the revolution itself.

The concessions made to the cooperatives, to the rural bourgeoisie and to foreign capital, the abolition of workers' control and the direction from above of the state by chinovnik methods - all these measures, writes Preobrazhensky, commenting on the decisions of the regional party conference in the Urals, "particularly acutely affect the Urals, where foreign capital had made immense investments before the revolution, a territory which with its natural resources is most attractive for world capital even today, and which, being the most organized area, has made the greatest progress in the construction of socialism." Consequently, the state-capitalism experiment means, in the eyes of the local cadres, also an action against the Urals, the neglect of the regional party organization. This is why they protest vigorously against "the plenipotentiary commissars coming from above and causing chaos", decide to establish a local autonomous organ, the Uralskaia Trudovaia Kommuna, almost tantamount to a federative republic, and call for the convening of a party congress, to be in contrast to the Seventh, really representative.

Preobrazhensky declares with real pride: we had already taken our decisions before the April theses of the Moscow "left communists" became known in the Urals. Our economic resolution, for example, - he writes - "is

not the result of a theoretical deduction, but is based on the practical experience of the socialist transformation of the Urals.⁶⁷ This is how communist conviction and a determined defence of regional interest are interwoven inextricably for the historical observer, too.

2.2. The unknown agrarian politician
/or the alternatives of the socialist transformation of agriculture/

This question may sound rather unhistorical: would we have found Preobrazhensky among the "left communists" even if he, on returning from Siberia, had been thrown by his good fortune not to the Urals, radical from the very outset, but to some more conservative middle-peasant region? Perhaps this approach is not so absurd if we also take into account the essential shift of emphasis, which took place in his way of thinking in less than a year. A shift caused mainly by the fact that he, after his experiences in the "progressive" proletarian Urals, has the opportunity, during the Civil War, to get acquainted with the "reactionary" peasant Urals and also with some of the central gubernii. In the case of a hot-headed demagogue this change would certainly result in distrust and in a flare-up of hatred against the reluctant class ally. It is Preobrazhensky's merit that he, becoming aware of the actual power relations, begins to familiarize himself with the new situation realistically and with readiness to make compromises.

In the foregoing I have tried to prove three assertions about Preobrazhensky's alleged "war communism". These are, to put it in a somewhat oversimplified way, as follows: 1/ if he is a radical Bolshevik, he is also a conformist and lobbyist; 2/ if he is a "left communist", he is rather a "mid-left" one; 3/ and, finally, if he is

a "war communist" at all, he is so in a decentralist sense and prematurely. I have complemented the last statement by references to Preobrazhensky's subsequent gradual disillusionment with radicalism. While, in this process, the invariably radical final aim of communism shifts in his perception from the near future to an indefinitely remote point of time, concern with the peasantry, with the affairs of the nation, and with his daily office work ripens in him a realistic, socialist programme of a longer transition period well before the introduction of the NEP. How does he lose his illusions in 1918-1920?

2.2.1. The programme of "legal" nationalization.

Those who know Preobrazhensky in his Trotskyist period as a politician demanding the "milking of the peasantry", or as the author of theoretical works, which contain, in the NEP period, no agrarian programme, /quite inconceivable in the Russian context/ will certainly be surprised to learn: he is, in the heroic age, an important /if not the most important/ agrarian expert of the Bolshevik party. Already his début in Pravda is marked by articles on the peasant programme.⁶⁸ At the end of 1917 and for about two years afterwards he pours out articles on that subject nearly each week. He writes a number of pamphlets on the grain monopoly, on rural wage-labour, and on the attitude of the peasants toward socialism⁶⁹, while he travels all around the country diligently collecting his experiences about changes in rural life. In the meantime, he begins to see with increasing clarity the "realities of life", which he finds no longer as simple as before.

In December 1917, he begins his journalistic activity in Pravda, still demanding a new Bolshevik agrarian

programme, emphasizing that the acceptance of the SR-type socialization should be considered as a simple tactical concession. In the alternative of land distribution with or without nationalization, he votes for the former, but reckons already at that time with a long transition period until, after overcoming the insistence of the peasantry on independent small holdings, the ideal situation, "the conscious regulation of the economy /at least/ on a national scale," is attained. In the belt between private and state economy he can imagine a great number of intermediate solutions, which rely on the traditions of the peasantry's common land use, but do not yield one iota from the final aim, nationalization, "unless - as he writes - we want to revise the very concept of socialism."⁷⁰

But nationalization is with Preobrazhensky already at that time, too primarily a category of property rights. He does not announce a forced unification of small farms, which constitute the overwhelming majority, and suggests the creation of the so-called "social model farms" only on the state-owned land or on the confiscated landowners', kulak and church lands. In addition, state ownership would be exercised in his conception by the centre in joint co-operation with the local organs of people's power. The state or "social cultivation" of land /obshchestvennaya obrabotka zemli/ would not be carried out in a factory organization, but in the artel' form, with the participation, in the first place, of the poor peasantry /bedniaks/.⁷¹

According to his draft programme, state regulation would gradually be extended over agriculture as a whole. In the first stage, in addition to the grain monopoly, trade in agricultural machines should be taken over by the state, and rural wage-labour should be restricted /not abolished/. All this should be done by vigorous incentives

/by directing part of the trading capital into agriculture/, by enlightening the peasantry, which would necessarily lead to a situation where "independent small holders would take sides en masse and voluntarily join the army of socialist labour."⁷²

In Preobrazhensky's view, the next party congress must take decisions, apart from the simple nationalization programme, on the complete socialist transformation of agriculture. Hence, at the turn of the years 1917 and 1918, emphasis is still on the completeness and consistency of the agrarian programme, on the principle of state control, and on the defence of the interests of the poor peasantry, who might be brought again into an unfavourable position by the restratification resulting from the distribution of land. The description of the situation is still invariably optimistic: the "worker-peasant bloc" is firm, because the peasantry is fully aware of the fact that the land has been secured for it by the proletariat, which has also abolished the peasants' domestic and the country's foreign debts. Thereby the fate of the two classes has been materially forged once for all, and thus the fear of a peasant counter-revolution appears to be unjustified.⁷³

Although this thesis of "the peasantry bought off by the revolution" is by no means devoid of disdain for the allied class often experienced in the Russian labour movement, it already foreshadows the "young" Preobrazhensky's pragmatic attitude to the agrarian question. It is indeed hard to believe that the future economic theorist, who will write in 1924 about the necessary exploitation of the peasantry, should characterize, as early as January 1918 /still as a "left communist"/, the distribution of the national income between industry and agriculture, and the resulting conflict of interests by the following sentences: "... The peasantry and the proletariat will

increase their respective incomes not by putting the values taken from the pocket of one class into the pocket of the other, but will multiply the quantity of the new values in the case of both classes... Consequently, the conflict of interests in question is not so much inevitable objectively that one class should exercise a political dictatorship over the other ... or exploit it." The planned income distribution preventing incidental quarrelling is to be understood at fixed prices, with grain and foreign-trade monopoly, and the money reform /!/ is not missing among the conditions either.⁷⁴

Illusions? Certainly, but in a somewhat different sense from what we would expect. For the basic war communist idea of leaping right into communism does not occur among them at all. Therefore, this dream will not have to be denied by Preobrazhensky later on. "They should not tell us that this is the immediate aim to be implemented already tomorrow" - he declares with perfect clarity about the socialist transformation of agriculture. But a programme is a programme. "Under the pretext of practical concessions made to the past, we cannot renounce the drafting of the future because the fight for this future will not begin tomorrow, but is already carried on today."⁷⁵

2.2.2. The peasant wants something different.

It appears, Preobrazhensky felt that he would badly need the certainty embodied in the agrarian programme in the Civil War period. Because he comes to experience the first half year of the struggle against the Czech legion and Kolchak as a complete failure. Thus, as the captain, who has to leave his sinking ship, he, too is bound under the pressure of the Whites, to retreat from Perm, together with the Third Army in December 1918. In addition, the Urals Regional Committee of the Bolsheviks,

is dissolved)
lost its function by the Central Committee. The president of the Regional Committee, Preobrazhensky has to look for a new job.⁷⁶ /As a result, his organizational basis is greatly impaired. Although he is transferred to Moscow and will soon obtain nominally higher posts, he will no longer feel a secure support in the party organization of the Urals, with its nearly 40 thousand members as a pressure group, except for the few months before the IX Party Congress./

He is saved, presumably, from suffering a serious loss of his ideological certainty by beginning early enough to understand /in July 1918/ the realities of the Civil War. While analyzing the social background of anti-Soviet movements, in his series of articles written in Pravda⁷⁷ on the counter-revolution in the Urals, anti-Soviet movements, he does not make any attempt to gloss over the real situation. Neither does he overlook the spontaneous mutiny of the Moslem and Cossack population, nor does he conceal the sympathy felt by certain strata of industrial workers with the Whites. But he does not as yet entertain the idea that the middle peasantry can be won for the aims of the Reds, and continues to regard the Russian village in a dual - kulak-bedniak - breakdown.

The sense of being encircled does not put Preobrazhensky into a state of intellectual panic and he continues to keep up his alternative ideas about the agrarian question. Hence, two paths are open to the socialist transformation of the village: one leading from below in a roundabout way through the communes, the other directly from above, by the "social cultivation" of the old large estates. But in both cases the method will be gradual persuasion of the peasant, and not compulsion. The new collective agricultural organizations will carry on an equal exchange with urban industry, either in kind or in money form, at fixed /so-called "hard"

prices.⁷⁸ All this does not, of course, prevent Preobrazhensky from demanding in his report to the Urals Regional Party Committee that "all branches of production should be placed on communist foundations" and that "products should be distributed according to the needs of the country as a whole."⁷⁹

The pro-seredniak adjustment of peasant policy may be dated from the first days of Preobrazhensky's "exile" from the Urals to Moscow /February 1919/. Thus he will be "in line" not only with the resolution passed in March by the VIII Congress of the party on the support of the middle peasants, but he also definitely anticipates its essence. The idea of the revision springs, of course, not simply from the mind of the regional party functionary pondering over the Civil War losses, over the question "why does the peasant not support us?" Preobrazhensky, working in the commission preparing the new party programme for the Congress, has again the opportunity to get an insight into the ideas of Bolshevik top leadership.

In his article urging a public discussion prior to the Congress, the issue of "colossal importance" of the revaluation of the relationship to the middle peasantry is already among the question to be discussed immediately, without any commitment for the time being.⁸⁰ But a few days later it will become evident where Preobrazhensky really leaning to when he begins to play on the idea of the "social cultivation" of land. When greeting the peasants' spontaneous initiatives experienced at several places /common ploughing and sowing etc./, he speaks of "socialism springing out of the chernoziem", which much more deserves support than the traditional rural cooperatives, where, as he thinks, state subsidies are, in the final analysis, beneficial to the rich peasants.⁸¹

Already the title of the study in which Preobrazhensky sums up his ideas about agrarian policy for the Congress:

"Along the paths leading to socialism in agriculture"⁸² gives much away about his concept. With the exception of the old-type cooperatives, he thinks that several paths are imaginable at the same time, exhibits great tolerance in the choice between them, does not conceal even the seamy side of the "most" communist solutions and - as he did earlier - does not mistake the maximalism of law for the realism of economic practice. He welcomes the law on the nationalization of land waiting for approval, but does not fail to emphasize what protracted and strenuous work will have to be done by the government before its provisions can be put in force, before, to use his expression, "the music of the future" can be heard everywhere.⁸³

In his view, exactly three paths lead to socialism in agriculture: the sovkhоз, the commune and the "social cultivation" of land. Sovkhоз, the organization with industry-like, large-scale production methods, belonging to the irrevocable ideals of practically all "regular" socialists at the beginning of the century, is associated, strangely enough, with tormenting doubts in Preobrazhensky's way of thinking. Sovkhоз equals socialism, but only a "little bit of socialism" - he says using his favourite journalistic phrase. It is nonsense that it should be the dominant form of transition if only because the distributed lands should not be nationalized from above, with a view of establishing sovkhозы on them. But if they have already been established, who should direct them? He himself has, as is usual in his thinking at that time, serious reservations concerning the advantages of central guidance and, as regards internal organization, he suggests - for the time being - "only" workers' control, because agricultural workers are still too backward to perform independent management.

If not sovkhоз, then commune? "It is a primitive form" - says Preobrazhensky making a wry face. Small-scale

production, temporary community, usually of urban workers migrating from hunger to the countryside, it is a collective experiment not shaped by the logic of economic activity. Its path to socialist agriculture is more twisted and narrower than the path leading to the sovkhоз. What is more, the commune adjust itself at least as inflexibly as the state farm to the production and distribution habits of the Russian village.

Although, in principle, both would be desirable paths, the peasant obviously wants something else - and this is the decisive element for Preobrazhensky. The village experiments with "social cultivation" while preserving some of the traditions of the obshchina, and does so en masse, even without the pressure on the part of the communists. This is, partly, also a large-scale form of production, and thus it meets better than the commune the demands for increasing agricultural productivity, which is, surprisingly, often a more important consideration for Preobrazhensky than any ideological requirements. It represents a transition to socialist agriculture to use his formulation: "from Asiatic small-scale farming to communal large-scale estates"/ in such a way that in the process it does not impoverish the private economy. The means of production are jointly used in the loose organization, the fragmentation of land is diminished, while the traditional principles of the private peasants, with respect to distribution and consumption are not violated.⁸⁴

2.2.3. Power to the middle-peasant, too?

Has Preobrazhensky still something original to say about agrarian policy even after the VII Congress? He has a lot. It seems as if his turnaround from the poor

to the middle peasant has opened a valve in his thinking. On returning from his tour of inspection in the countryside, he publishes his experiences in five parts in Pravda to break - as he writes - the official optimism of a few party leaders.⁸⁵ He observes that the middle peasantry is reluctant to accept the local council posts, and these positions are occupied by lumpen elements, by so-called "communists" joining the party only to make their fortunes. "... The word 'communist' becomes a swear word, the symbol of violence and hooliganism". Hence, no wonder if the talented middle strata of the peasantry draw closer to the cooperatives including well-to-do people.

The central agencies have distorted information about what really happens in the villages. Earlier, as a result of the great propaganda around the committees of the poor peasants /the kombedy and the communes, the whole of agriculture was declared ripe for socialism. And now, while the middle peasantry is still held to be counter-revolutionary, even the faith in gradual socialization is lost. At the same time, the middle peasant is opposed not to Soviet power in general, but to the communes organized by force by "declassed workers and peasants", or to the intertwining of communes, kombedy communist party organizations and local councils. Hard-working peasants see in the communes - often justifiably - an association of parasites - thus Preobrazhensky draws his disheartened final conclusion.⁸⁶

By this, he banishes once for all from his train of thought the ideological generalization that "our main ally is the poor peasant". He becomes perhaps poorer by one myth, but richer by one dilemma: what should be done if /formulated in his favourite Marxist terms/ the development of the productive forces in Soviet-Russian agriculture, too is assured by the activity of strata which do not represent the most progressive production

relations and are also politically unreliable. And vice versa what might happen if socialist production forms prove hardly workable?

He comes to fact these questions, when, on the one hand, he sees the increased striving of the peasantry for resettlement after land distribution and recognizes that the enterprising peasants leaving the village commune - just as in the pre-1917 times - work much more efficiently when moving near their lands and cultivating their individual farms;⁸⁷ and when, on the other hand, he suddenly realizes - quoting his words - that "our sovkhозы in their present forms have nothing else to show but their misery."⁸⁸ Within the world of Bolshevik ideology, the problem is of course impossible to resolve for Preobrazhensky, too.

Yet he begins very soon to ponder over the solution without any serious war communist prejudice, even though he goes from one extreme to the other. For at one moment he seems to accept, although with some indignation, the demand of the resettled peasantry to guarantee them the undisturbed use of their lands for at least 9 years.⁸⁹ In the mood of "communism expected to come tomorrow" this would be hard to imagine, just as the fact that the class-indifferent term "ambitious"⁹⁰ appears among Preobrazhensky's concepts of sociological analysis. Also it would be strange to expect a Bolshevik politician who is under the spell of war communism, to promise the peasantry, like Preobrazhensky, does that mobilizations, requisitions, and the levying of surtax will be ended, or that state administration through elected local representatives will be introduced as soon as the Civil War is over. It would be no less surprising if he, like Preobrazhensky, spoke of the middle peasantry as "a participant in power", and, horribile dictu, as "a shareholder of the revolution" entitled to demand dividends after its victory, or to out-vote the board of directors at the general meeting.⁹¹

While first he goes as far as undertaking this risky analogy of power-sharing in its entirety, immediately afterwards he calls a halt to his roaming thoughts and tries, with appropriate vigilance, to set the ideological and political limits to the changes to be made in favour of the peasantry. He admits that the abuses of the dissolved committees of poor peasants cost the government hundreds of millions, and, as he says, "the davai-davai type", topsy-turvy campaigns have to stop. He warns at the same time: do not allow under the pretext of compensating the middle peasants, the bedniaks to be plundered and the kulaks to get rich. We cannot give up any of the positions gained by the poor peasantry, and "play games with democracy when we are encircled by dark counter-revolution." Nobody should think that communist rule will be mitigated to become a kind of neutral Soviet power purged of the Bolsheviks only because it would be desirable if the party stopped working as "an administrative appendage" of the state agencies and if, in contrast to present practice, not "the tax collector persuaded the taxpayer" to exercise his civic duty.⁹²

One extreme against another extreme? I think that the matter is not as serious as that. I suggest we should rather get accustomed to the fact that Pre-obrazhensky, whenever he detects that he has gone too far in a pragmatic reasoning, suddenly realizes it and puts his ideological defensive reflexes into operation, which usually help him to unburden his conscience by making a host of announcements in a radical spirit. This pattern of behaviour is of course not unknown in other Bolshevik theoreticians and politicians either, who live under the burden of objectives which are "continually just now" impossible to implement. But as regards the

ratio of reality to rhetoric, Preobrazhensky definitely differs from his colleagues in his consistently practical pondering over current problems and in his abandoning, one by one, the dogmas in which he has lost his faith. Thus, his "war communist" phrases may be increasingly interpreted as nostalgic pictures of lost /or suspended/ radicalism.

2.2.4. Marking time with ebbing patience.

If we were to examine Preobrazhensky's views on agrarian policy exclusively on the basis of his writings published after the autumn of 1919, it would be rather difficult to relate them to his gestures, made in principle, to the middle peasantry a few months before. It is not that he withdrew anything /this he does not do up to his "submission" in 1929/, but - apart from his synthesis The ABC of Communism - he generally does not repeat himself. He goes into details and adjusts his tone: both changes being, connected, it appears, with Preobrazhensky's world outlook assuming a "central" character. His links to the village become looser, and acting in the central agitprop machinery and directing it as a CC secretary/^{after} April 1920, it is increasingly the daily official tasks of the supreme party apparatus rather than local experiences that determine his course of thinking. The tone of his works also changes accordingly and becomes sometimes supercilious and peremptory. It is no longer merely ideological faith that is designed to offset the practical concessions made to the peasantry, but also some contemptuous phrases about the inconsistent and incalculable behaviour of the ally.

In his works mercilessly dissecting the Red Army, he repeatedly comes to speak of the figure of the middle peasant hesitating between the Reds and the Whites, exhibiting in difference, often hostility towards the Soviet power and inclinations to desert. To quote his words: "the peasant sand" can only be reinforced by "proletarian cement".⁹³ The peasant who, when fighting, "defends his land and not socialism", whose instability is primarily responsible for the defeats suffered in the Civil War, is expected now, on the verge of victory, when he need not be afraid of losing his land, to display new uncertainties. We must not forget that the peasantry has tried several times "to devolve all burdens of the struggle onto the proletariat, even if the struggle has been fought for the revolutionary aims not only of the workers, but also of the peasants" - he states rather distrustfully.⁹⁴

Despair undoubtedly plays a role in these suspicions: how is it possible that, despite the compromising, conciliatory policy measures of the Bolshevik government, great masses of the middle peasantry still join forces at once, whenever one white general is defeated, with the next?! Nevertheless, disillusionment does not sound retreat for Preobrazhensky at this juncture either. True, he does not make progress either. At the X Congress, he will support Lenin's prodnalog ^(food tax) proposal enthusiastically,⁹⁵ but for the time being he does not give evidence of his desire to liberalize agrarian policy further. In principle, he continues, by and large, the "marking time" tactics, and in practice - in conformity with his party obligations - , shifts the emphasis from the analysis of the situation to central agitation and mobilization to change it.

But he preserves his sense of reality, and, even in the euphoria of the victory in 1920, does not join those who wish to make the village communist as soon as possible. His view of the sovkhozy, for example, does not change for the better in 1919 either, and is no longer enthusiastic about the workers' control developing in them. "Where /agricultural/ workers make any attempt at all to have a say in management, they have done it so far exclusively with the aim of carving something out for themselves to improve their position" - says Preobrazhensky resignedly.⁹⁶ Yet he does not search for an appropriate cure in the centralization of these Soviet farms. Quite the contrary, in conformity with Sapronov, the future "decemist", /with whom he will soon kick up a row precisely over matters of party organization/ he attacks the bureaucratism of Vesenkha /the Supreme Council of National Economy/ and Narkomzem /the People's Commissariat of Agriculture/. It is perhaps here too that he gives the clearest formulation of his decentralist creed: "It is necessary to rely in full measure on local forces in managing affairs, and the role of the centre must be confined to general direction, or to providing all sorts of help where the local forces are unable to cope with the matters alone."⁹⁷

Even if the state of the sovkhozy does not find his approval, yet that of the communes does. On the one hand, he becomes aware of the fact that now not only the poor, but also the more enterprising middle peasants are setting about a kind of common farming, and on the other hand, he discovers that the communes sometimes transact exchange in kind with one another.⁹⁸ Yet this combination of efficiency with a communist economic form does not win Preobrazhensky's approval

to such an extent that he would propose this collective solution in his question-and-answer brochure On the Peasant Communes,⁹⁹ published in the second half of 1919. This propaganda torrent, promising all conceivable earthly good, presented in the form of a talk between a Bolshevik and a peasant, is designed, despite its title, to popularize in fact nothing else but the "social cultivation" of the land.

"You work half as much in the fields and harvest twice as much as you did before". You may rename your village called "Bezhkhebnaia" /figuratively: "Want"/ to-day, "Khlebnaia" /"Wealth"/ tomorrow. Machines will come from the West, there will be plenty of fertilizers and many Soviet agronomists. The dukhozor factionalists also worked in communes for several decades /"... do not forget, they were not some high-ranking foreign rich men, but muzhiki of our own from Tambov, Voronezh and Poltava"/ - it is in this style that the highly prejudiced arguments of the communist agitator pour forth without an end.

But as soon as he comes to speak of the institutional set-up of the economy, the "advertising expert" Preobrazhensky immediately regains his composure: common ploughing and sowing, perhaps harvesting and the joint use of machines and draught animals will do for the time being, it is not compulsory to enter the commune, anybody can withdraw his land and resources from it, and the membership may decide on the method of distribution later on, and even then egalitarian solutions must not be applied forcibly. /Here Preobrazhensky uses the terms artel'naia zapashka and obshchestvennaia obrabotka as synonyms./

How little Preobrazhensky's principles of agrarian policy have changed in the meantime, is best shown

by the great summary, The ABC of Communism dated October 1919. Although he and Bukharin compile it altogether in three weeks,¹⁰⁰ in order to popularize the party's new programme, nevertheless it provides a good opportunity for the party functionary-journalist, who has just arrived from the Urals, to rise to the ranks of the party's theoretical élite. At that time he cannot yet know that posterity will hardly keep in evidence that the chapter /in addition, Chapter XIII/, which is, perhaps, the most important from the point of view of the recipes of socialism, and nearly the half of the book of several hundred pages is written by Preobrazhensky. It is also true, of course, that this summary written by him in the role of an agrarian theorist is at the same time his swan-song. He will be engaged, like in chapters XV and XVI, also written by him, in such subjects as banking, money turnover, budgetary matters, etc., and will become the party's first theoretical economist in the financial field for several years.

Here are just two short quotations from the "ABC":

"... for a long time to come small-scale peasant farming will continue to exist; for a long time to come small-scale peasant farming will be the predominant form of Russian agriculture alike in respect of the area thus cultivated and in respect of the quantity of agricultural produce. The question therefore arises, how can we help this method of farming..."¹⁰¹

"... while striving to effect the socialist transformation of agriculture, we must be careful to avoid alienating the middle peasants by ill-considered and premature measures, and must make no attempt to coerce them into forming communes and artels."¹⁰²

It is these two ideas that determine the keynote of the chapter on the agrarian question as a quasi-independent study. The middle peasantry must be allowed to choose, at its discretion, a loose transitory form for the "social cultivation" of the land /here again is his old pet idea/, which is even more informal than the artel. The preservation of the ideals of large-scale farming, urban and suburban agriculture, or the sporadic references to a possible expropriation of the kulaks and to the establishment of professional associations for the poor peasants will serve again the ideological "packaging" of the basic compromise even for Preobrazhensky himself.

2.2.5. Sickle and hammer /from loan to primitive accumulation/.

The pragmatic approach to agrarian policy remains typical of his activity even in early 1920 /he does not expect that urban and suburban agriculture will increase large-scale grain production^{lo3}, and criticizes the setting up of a labour army which divorces the peasant from his home, is not efficient and instigates resistance^{lo4}, etc./, but it appears that with the passing of time he also begins to set the price of the practical standpoint represented by him.

I have spoken so far of "the peasantry bought off" by the revolution. Now I could also put it like this: losing his patience, Preobrazhensky presents the bill to the village." He does it with some indignation, but in the most natural way as in business negotiation: in exchange for the easing of its burdens,

now significantly less than under tsarism, the peasantry is expected to display at least political neutrality, and of course to fulfil its commitments towards the state /requisitioning, compulsory labour service, etc./. It is a kind of bargain, which is all the more favourable for the peasant - he keeps on asserting - as all that we demand is a loan which we shall repay in proportion to the reconstruction of the industry.¹⁰⁵

And here a new thread of thought is beginning to manifest itself in Preobrazhensky's argumentation. Starting along this path, he moves with alarming rapidity from simply requiring the peasantry to undertake /let us call it/ "equal burden-bearing" to the acceptance of "primitive socialist accumulation", /a principle borrowed through Bukharin from V.Smirnov/, that is, requiring "unequal distribution of the burden",¹⁰⁶ which will be unfavourable to the peasantry for quite a long time. This is the path that will also lead him from a narrow sectoral approach toward comprehensive, macro-economic analyses, and to works which claim to deal with economic theory at all. /In vain does Gosizdat /the State Publishers/ - working by the way, under his supervision - "mobilize" Preobrazhensky in October 1920 to produce for the party, within three months, a book with the title The Peasantry and Communism he turns a deaf ear to the command. At that time, he is already engaged in concluding his study on paper money./¹⁰⁷

In support of the idea "the peasantry is indebted", the account is half ready by the summer 1919, which is, for the time being, only designed as a reminder of the immense sum of money that the villages had to pay to the Tsar each year. In the spring of 1920, however, Preobrazhensky bashfully admits: true, we take less

from the peasant, but "give practically nothing in return for it".¹⁰⁸ He feels that this state is impossible to reconcile with the slogan formulated by him a short time before that "no class thrusts its hand into the other's pocket". Therefore, he hastens to declare reassuringly: "the Soviet power does not forget its debts."¹⁰⁹

Here Preobrazhensky gets into a mess. On the one hand, as a CC secretary responsible for propaganda in the village, he incessantly repeats, that the peasantry can be persuaded to take a neutral stance /let alone to desist from taking up arms against the Reds/ only if the agitator demonstrates - as he says - "by figures in hands" how much the peasantry would lose by a possible restoration.¹¹⁰ This is how the accurate account is made up by the time of the first "Week of the Peasant" - as they call it /August 1920/. In the course of the propaganda campaign, the peasants must get to know that, compared to Tsarist times, the Soviet government takes away from them only one tenth in the form of razverstka /requisitioning/.¹¹¹

On the other hand, however improvised and heavily prejudiced this calculation is, this one tenth /230 million pud of grain/ cannot be juggled away by calling it a loan in mass propaganda or in theory. /Let it be said, to Preobrazhensky's credit, that a few months later he re-adjusts the comparison by making it more objective. The village paid, he says, only seven times as much before 1917, but he adds at once: in 1918/19 even the town did not fail to pay compensation to the village./¹¹²

But first he tries to get round the problem by some spectacular phrases. /It is an "ill-luck" both of Preobrazhensky and of Soviet economic science that these considerations, originally partly journalistic, partly practical, and partly explicitly ideological in nature,

will soon prove to be too fascinating. / "Give grain first, then you will get textiles, and not the other way round. For the hammer to strike, the sickle must work first" - sounds Preobrazhensky's slogan in clear reference to the emblem of the revolution.¹¹³ That grain is needed for the supply of the army in the first place, and not for the urban population, is merely a difference in degree for him: the army defends socialist industry. And that the sickle, too ought to be produced in order that it can work /that the slogan can also be formulated on the reverse/ is of no interest to him either now or later.

More precisely, the promise to repay the loan compels him, for the purposes of reconciliation of the peasantry, to give a rough outline of the expected stages of Soviet economic development in a pamphlet written for the third anniversary of the revolution:¹¹⁴ "... The peasants ask the government day by day when finally they will get textiles, nails, ploughs, scythes, axes. In order that the peasant may understand when he will get everything he needs, every farmer must get acquainted with the economic plan of the worker-peasant power. This is as follows. A large house cannot be built without any foundations, directly on the earth. Industry, too must be restored from its very foundations. Such foundations are transport and fuel. The factories cannot start working without fuel, without grain to feed the workers, without raw materials. All this must be transported. ... The first foundation stone is the railway... The restoration of the railway and of the plants supplying it..., and, finally, the production of the fuel consumed by them - this is the first task. ... The second is the reconstruction of the textile in-

dustry and of all that is needed by this branch of industry. Also second in importance are nails, axes, scythes, ploughs, that is, all that is necessary for agriculture. Hence, when Soviet power, in the framework of labour service, compels the peasant to fell and transport timber, to remove the snow from the rails, or to deliver grain for feeding the workers, the peasant must perform these tasks in full awareness that he works, in the last analysis, for his own advantage..."¹¹⁵

Golden rules of propaganda - we might say - for purposes of mass consumption. Really, it would not be worthwhile to pay special attention to it, if the above logic did not reoccur innumerable times /and, furthermore, in the same simplified form/ in the case of most leading Bolshevik thinkers /let us mention only Trotsky's famous speech on industrialization at the XII Congress./

Thus the delayed repayment of the loan received from the peasantry is guaranteed by an axiomatic model of economic development. If we cannot start the repayment today and cannot promise any good for tomorrow either, please wait for the day after tomorrow! At least an outright speech.

Now that the "theory" is available, all that is lacking is the ideological reinforcement to make the development order acceptable agriculture, heavy industry and light industry. And here the "Bukharin connection" comes in handy, and with it the thesis of "primitive socialist accumulation" which, though containing nothing substantially new against the loan concept, nevertheless fits in well with the Marxian tradition. /Thus the speech becomes even more outright. It is not by chance that Lenin protests against flirting with this concept in

the case of Bukharin./ Bukharin's influence can already be traced when The Econoics of the Transition Period was published. Preobrazhensky's review of the book¹¹⁶ shows already in August 1920, that the semi-official theoretical approval of the destruction and state coercion following the revolution is to his liking. Coercion which Preobrazhensky as a good Marxist, is not willing to regard as a purely non-economic factor./True, here he takes over from Bukharin only the category of "socialist accumulation", and separates it from the necessary emergency measures applied in agriculture partly even before the revolution/.

All is not lost that is delayed. A little attention to the analysis of the national economy, a little withdrawal from the village, taking a little taste of the central power, and necessity becomes a virtue. Preobrazhensky, who not long ago does not venture to confess even to himself that the exchange between agriculture and industry has become extremely unequal for a considerable time, declares, in his first theoretical economic study, written at the end of 1920, on the subject of paper money, now quite naturally, even trimphantly: "the partial expropriation of the surplus product of small producers", "the alienation of part of their incomes" for the purposes of "primitive socialist accumulation". He draws the picture of a long-lasting, painful process, in which the peasantry takes part in the reconstruction of the socialist sector by direct taxation in kind /requisitioning/ and by indirect taxation /primarily inflation/.¹¹⁷

Different is the moral presentation of the matter, too. In the scientific analysis the "ambitious middle peasant" appears as a commodity producer taking an unfair advantage of his market-monopoly position,

evading state taxation and favouring the black market, and not as a social stratum needing economic help, and to whom, by the way, the state is also indebted.¹¹⁸ Preobrazhensky would, probably, protest against discussing the question on ethical grounds. Primitive socialist accumulation is - he would and partly does say - the historically necessary consequence of Russian backwardness, of war destructions and of the delay of world revolution. What has it to do with ethics? Victorious revolutions in the more developed countries will also begin their career with destruction, but in the course of reconstruction they will not have to reckon - as Soviet Russia has had to - with the innumerable troubles of the industrialization /modernization/ of the economy.¹¹⁹ What is involved here is incomparably more serious than the question of who owes what, temporarily to, whom. We should not mix up political economy with daily political tactics, he would be sure to fulminate as he will often do with Bukharin a few years later. And, as regards actual politics, let us be satisfied with stating - he would add - how much the peasant gains numerically by being taxed not by the Tsar but by the Soviet power. And anyway, if we start moralizing, do not the emergency measures of primitive accumulation drain the consumption of the workers, who acquired land for the peasantry?¹²⁰

2.2.6. Agitation from the Central Committee.

Thus would the year 1920 be nevertheless a turning-point in Preobrazhensky's thinking in the matter of agrarian policy? Will the newly appointed secretary of the Central Committee become a real war communist, just when the Civil War is practically over? The question is decided ultimately by the extent to which the above-

mentioned theoretical innovations influence Preobrazhensky's practical proposals in the field of economic policy. On the question of whether he will develop a consequent war communist standpoint at the level of economic theory at all, I shall say more later on./

As a CC secretary also supervising the new department of the Central Committee responsible for rural affairs, he does not inundate his subordinates with too many instructions. /Of the 132 CC circulars issued between the IX and and X Congresses altogether 8 are concerned - and mostly only superficially - with agriculture./¹²¹ He is rather engrossed in peasant propaganda, in which, while constantly criticizing his colleagues, he tries - as we have seen - to make rural agitation more practical. At the IX Conference in September 1920, he demands methods adjusted to "peasant psychology";¹²² in the same month he speaks about a long, difficult and very cautious agitation in the interest of the socialist transformation of small-scale farming;¹²³ and at the X Congress /in March 1921/ he bursts out: "... nowhere has so much nonsense been spoken as in our rural agitation... It is no good agitating the peasant for socialism and incessantly trying to convince him that it is bound to come."¹²⁴

For his part, he would like to set an example by emphasizing graduality and spontaneity: "In order to put an end to the low efficiency of small-scale farming, the peasant need not renounce his own farm, under the pressure of violence, against his own will, at the cost of sufferings and tears, The way is open for him to co-operate voluntarily..." To co-operation, which the government is glad to promote, expressed metaphorically: as "the proletarian locomotive" pulling the heavy "peasant waggons" towards communism.¹²⁵

Only propaganda phrases? We might perhaps think so if these agitative phrases were not linked to a basic idea which first appears in Preobrazhensky's argumentation in November 1920; and to which he remains faithful in such a degree that it will constitute a Leitmotiv of his anti-utopia /From NEP to Socialism/ published in 1922. What I have in mind is /what we might call/ the "idea of internationalization" of the worker-peasant alliance. According to this, the middle peasantry as practically the only food supplier of the country deserves a particular treatment. Not only because without it the Soviet power would have been unable to face the challenge of the Civil War, but also because the middle peasants will save the revolutions in Western Europe, too, when capitalist America resorts to a grain embargo to starve out its socialist opponents. "We are witnessing the opening prospects of a common economic bloc of our middle peasantry and of the whole European proletariat" - declares Preobrazhensky optimistically.

But an indispensable precondition of the alliance is the large improvement of Soviet-Russian agriculture, "which can be conceived as taking place in the next decade /sic!/ on a massive scale only through the development of middle-peasant farming" - he hastens to add cautiously.¹²⁶ Even if - we may say with the easy wisdom of posterity - Preobrazhensky is wrong in prophesying with a world revolutionary pathos the marriage of European technology with Russian grain, he more or less succeeds in predicting the point of time of Stalinist collectivization.

But this is, of course, by no means his intention. Yet there are not many in the leading circles of the Bolshevik party in 1920 who have the courage to give

the peasantry ten years of respite, while assuming, in addition, the advent of the European revolutions. And this towards the end of the years, in a political situation fatefully deteriorating for the communists, when it is commonly known how much less grain has been requisitioned than expected, and there is fearful anticipation of the collapse of the food supply in the spring, and later of the actually ensuing general famine; when in the public political atmosphere, heavily charged with the peasant revolt in the Tambov area and by the Kronstadt mutiny, the Bolshevik agrarian policy begins to apply the means of reconciliation and incentives only at the eleventh hour /at the X Congress/, having used formerly mostly compulsion in the village.

How does Preobrazhensky behave in this strained situation? I think that we cannot reassuringly conclude the discussion of his alleged "war communism" in agrarian policy and theory without reviewing in brief how he reacts to the state regulation of agriculture, a demand that is formulated in the upper strata of the party with increasing volume. This will be no easy task for us, as Preobrazhensky leads primarily a "party life" at the turn of 1920 and 1921, engages in the trade union dispute and broods over financial matters, and rarely states his views on the future of peasantry. No doubt, he does not refrain from attacking the reviving SR movement, or its right-wing leaders who are, by his opinion, fishing in troubled waters, instigating the village against Soviet power and idolizing the free market.¹²⁷

In the requisitioning versus food tax issue he takes no definite position, but it may be taken for granted that he does not see in it the watershed of

agrarian policy. He does not glorify the requisitioning system ideologically. He always ranks it among the emergency measures of the war. Even when he begins to preach the gospel of "primitive socialist accumulation", he sees the value of the razverstka virtually in its expediency: the rapidly devaluating money becomes after a while less and less suitable as a means of siphoning-off peasant incomes through taxation. But, as easily he adopts it, as quickly he is prepared to renounce it, as soon as it ceases to be useful.

For taxation in kind is not unknown to the village, but if its volume cannot be increased for political reasons, or if it happens to decline, then, in order to replace the outstanding inflationary incomes of the state, the requisitioning system is not irreconcilable with the issue of a new, stable money and with siphoning-off rural incomes through the market - says Preobrazhensky in his first financial study.¹²⁸

Requisitioning + market? This is virtually the same in the winter of 1920 as prodnalog will be in the spring of 1921 as one of the resolutions of the X Congress. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that Preobrazhensky, who simultaneously argues with Lenin in the trade union dispute, not only assures him of his unqualified support in the debate, of the introduction of food tax but, recognizing at once that what is involved here is not simply a quantitative reduction of requisitioning to taxation, puts forward a complete revision of the financial policy.¹²⁹

Thus, the New Econoic Policy does not constitute, at this juncture, a break in Preobrazhensky's course of action in agrarian policy. Moreover, even if we cannot know exactly the finer points of difference of opinion about the introduction of the prodnalog within

the Political Committee of the Party, he is likely not to have voted for maintaining the razverstka even when Trotsky first recommended its abolition in the spring of 1920. Or if he did, this could have been justified by - even subsequently not diminishing - fears: whether it will be possible later somehow to regain the quantity of agricultural products being lost as a difference between requisition and taxation? /With Preobrazhensky's words: "how can we replace what we got from the razverstka and what we shall not get from the prodnalog?"/¹³⁰

How can the state regulation of agriculture become stricter when the government relaxes compulsion in one of the most important fields, in the exchange between town and village? Of course by raising the degree of planning in peasant production - sounds the usual answer in Soviet agrarian management well after the declaration of the NEP, too. Following the desperately bad harvest of the year 1920, the party places, of course, a great emphasis on the efficient organization of the sowing campaign in the spring of 1921. Here an important role is also assigned to the "propaganda minister" Preobrazhensky. /It is over his signature that the main mobilizing circular of the CC is published in a February issue of Pravda, the only document, in which the his ideas about the war communist utopia of agricultural planning can be traced./¹³¹ For a conclusion, I will briefly comment on this.

It is a fact that after three years' intermission, the idea of state regulation also returns in Preobrazhensky's concepts, among other things, in the form of Osinskii's notorious compulsory sowing plan broken down by the centre. Mention is also made in that circular of establishing common local seed-grain funds and of

elaborating a system of technological norms for agriculture.¹³² Has Preobrazhensky, too lost his usual sobriety that, while the demobilizing soldiers revolt against oppression and exploitation in the villages, he should preach about further state interventions and about setting up "sowing committees" reminding of the former bedkomyt?

He has hardly lost it. Although we cannot know whether, had the NEP not been introduced, the idea of nationalizing agriculture through planning would have struck deeper roots in Preobrazhensky's thinking. After all his move towards state regulation is practically not too important. According to his ideas, a compulsory sowing plan would only be drawn up for plants needed by industry, seed-grain funds and norm setting would make sense within the context of economic forms to be organized for "mutual assistance" /this is, presumably, Preobrazhensky's new name for "social cultivation"/, and the newly established rural committees should be filled primarily with "ambitious peasants" /here is the old ideal/. All this would serve to "strengthen and develop" small-scale farming. And, finally, the inevitable promise: "the ambitious middle-peasant who, while growing in wealth, also defends the worker-peasant republic", "deserves to be rewarded" for his active participation."¹³³

2.3. Naturalization and centralization: theoretical dilemmas of a "war communist".

"While good communist literature promotes the success of the proletarian revolution, the case with good proletarian revolutions is just the opposite: they are hardly favourable to good literature."¹³⁴ It is in a similar mood, often mixed with self-tormenting apology, that Preobrazhensky begins each of his important works

written in the Civil War period. He scribbles his pamphlet on anarchism on the brinks of the trench, the manuscript of the hastily written textbook The ABC of Communism suffers damage when the building of the Moscow party organization is exploded,¹³⁵ and he has only time to write his study Paper money... when all the files in the Central Committee are already settled. Is it worthwhile, in view of these "mitigating circumstances", to search retrospectively for a coherent theory in his scholarly work? Especially if we also know that Preobrazhensky distinguishes himself after October 1917 primarily as an agrarian expert and begins to flirt with economic theory in the field of financial policy only towards the end of the year 1920.

No doubt, mention has already been made of a few important things concerning theory. If we are to arrange part of what has been outlined above according to new aspects, it is again due to the stubborn belief, provoking criticism that Preobrazhensky belongs to the war communist apostles of centralized and naturalized planned economy.

Let us make it clear right away: he certainly would have liked to belong to them /it is another question whether there were such people at all, and if there were, who they were/. But his sense of Realpolitik, his fully not suppressible decentralist leanings and - however strange it may appear - his theoretical reservations connected with the unsolved logical problems of Marxian economics prevent him from unsolved attaining this aim. When dealing with his "mid-left communist" period I have already made a few assumptions which contradict the above-mentioned belief. And in exploring his activity in agrarian policy, we might have had new doubts about Preobrazhensky's allegedly "war communist" attitude.

For this - generally condemning - qualification can hardly be attributed to anyone 1/ who confines himself to the "legal nationalization" of land, the most important factor of production; 2/ who popularizes informal and traditional ways of co-operation in the reorganization of agriculture with respect for the principles of graduality and spontaneity; 3/ who tolerates the middle peasant /the "shareholder" of the revolution/ and would even reward the particularly ambitious farmers as long as a decade, while considering them, in addition, as a guarantee of world revolution; 4/ who conceives state regulation of agriculture regionally in a decentralized way and, as regards its form, not according to a single plan; 5/ who, in the exchange between village and town, does not insist on complete naturalization, nor on the requisitioning form of siphoning-off incomes; and, finally, who in the level of theory, is unable to associate communism with poverty and backwardness and who, moreover, regards the tasks related to economic growth /reconstruction/ and modernization to be more important than the stunt of "leaping into communism."

If we omitted, with some distrust, half the above assertions of Preobrazhensky and said: let us now disregard the propaganda phrases, which are intended to reassure himself and the public, even then we could hardly deny that the author forecasts, with surprising objectivity, a protracted /socialist/ transition period. A socialist economy, in which neither centralization, nor naturalization and planning can be exceptional for a long time to come.

How would Preobrazhensky build up /if Bukharin had not preceded him/ his own Economics of the Transition Period? To give an answer, we need not have to refer back from his future "New Economics, as Preobrazhensky's

long-forgotten review¹³⁶ of Bukharin's book, which is well-known to this day, might provide an appropriate starting-point. Interestingly, in searching for the theoretical conflict of the two Bolshevik theoreticians this debate, with a reversed cast, regularly evades the attention of the historical analysts, despite the fact that on this occasion Preobrazhensky makes the argumentation of his former co-author about socialism questionable, true, in a moderate tone, but in its very foundations.

2.3.1. Confronting Bukharin

"... it appears - writes Preobrazhensky about Bukharin's book - that the author exaggerates the inadequacy of the basic concepts of political economy to analyse the economic relations of the transition period ... At present, 9/10 of the value produced in Russia is turned out by petty commodity-producers, and an enormous proportion of the goods produced but not consumed by the producers does not come to the state distribution organs but to the free market. Therefore, to declare that the category of value 'cannot be applied at all in the transition period' is a slight exaggeration. It is also too early to speak of the bankruptcy of the financial system. Coinage - not disturbed by the "economics of the transition period" - continues to circulate, while it loses nothing of its value; and paper money will not be of any use for us unless we set out from the basic concepts of political economy."¹³⁷

Commodity, value, money, etc. - these are, for Preobrazhensky already in 1920, categories, in whose dying out one can trust, but to disregard them is hardly

permissible if we are to understand the real situation. It is another thing that these concepts /as in socialist "mainstream-economics" up till now/ gain their real sense in the world of agricultural small-scale production, and "attack" state economy from outside. Is there anything else, besides the realism of his agrarian policy, that saves Preobrazhensky's economic thinking from shifting towards extreme naturalism?

I think it is, first of all, his suspicion, never ending completely, about the centralization of economic management. His basic principle, on an orthodox Marxist basis is this: the forms of organization and management should never be divorced from the given state of the productive forces. In other words: centralization is worth being urged only where the economy strives instinctively towards concentration. Small holdings, petty trade, small housing must not be centralized not only because of the political risk it involves, but also because this leads to the fragmentation of the strength of the centre and, in the last analysis, to anarchy. A tremendous fall in agricultural output, an expansion of the black market in trade and neglect of the maintenance houses will be the fatal consequences of haste - thus Preobrazhensky clearly foresees the economic history of socialism already in 1919, when explaining the party programme.¹³⁸

Attention! This is not simply /to use the language of the time/ oblastnichestvo, the ideological standpoint of the local "petty monarch", who takes offence only at the bureaucratic behaviour of the centre, but he himself divides power still less with his subordinates. Nor is it the position of the central party functionary, who willingly criticizes Soviet bureaucracy from above down-

wards, even beginning with the People's Commissariats. Here Preobrazhensky is simply very cautious and practical. How could we otherwise explain that a politician, program-oriented like him, who permanently requires a principally new agrarian programme, a new party programme, a new financial policy, who all along the 1920s will attack the party leadership because it does not represent a resolute economic policy etc., does not join, during the Civil War, those demanding the introduction of a "single plan" of the national economy, nor does he associate with the prophets of glavkism, of centralized and naturalized industrial management. For him, plan means economic policy, redistribution of the national income, strategy of economic development, and at most macro-economic regulation /e.g. declaration of foreign-trade monopoly/, but not a hierarchically organized mechanism of economic management relating to the economy as a whole.

He would give way to temptation, when appraising industrial management - as many at the top in the Vesenkha /the Supreme Council of the National Economy/ - if he, as an agrarian and financial expert, were not fully aware of industry being embedded in the economy as a whole. Although he is apparently enthusiastic about the internal naturalization of state industry, nevertheless he does not conceal it even from himself that in Soviet Russia a partly militarized, and partly non-functioning industry is "enjoying" the realization of the communist ideal. Consequently, it would be logical that Preobrazhensky should draw the conclusion - as in discussing the sovkhozy - that rapid communisation of the state industry may only lead to the "demonstration of misery". If he had not been absorbed in agrarian policy,

if not so much positive expectation had been attached, in Bolshevik theory and propaganda, to large-scale state industry /as to one of the "commanding heights" and the "citadel of the working class"/, he would likely have come to this conclusion, too. For in the course of the introduction of the NEP, as if the scales fell from his eyes, he becomes a dedicated follower of the khozraschet idea.

2.3.2. The communization of industry.

This "enlightening" is, of course, not without antecedents. Between 1917 and 1921, Preobrazhensky comes twice really close to the problems of economic management: first, when in 1917/18 he has to comment on practical decisions on industrial management, following the nationalization of enterprises in the Urals, and, secondly, when analyzing finances on country level at the end of 1920, he has to form his opinion about the relationship between the industrial sector and the state budget.

In the first case, everything still appears to be clear and simple. Given are the strong Uralian industrial area having tided over the war with relatively little hardship and capable of being self-subsistent in food supply, a stormy nationalization process and a very active Soviet apparatus with a Bolshevik majority at the regional level. What can prevent the industrial enterprises in the Urals from being transformed into a "single regional trust", in production, and a "syndicate" in procurement and marketing?¹³⁹ The original Bolshevik ideal - Preobrazhensky might think at that time - is realized at its best even if industry is organized not according to the principle "one country = one enterprise",

but according to the principle "one oblast' /region/ = two connected enterprises". The III regional Soviet congress of the Urals passes its resolution in this sense already in January 1918, long preceding thereby the similar decisions on industrial organization of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. The resolution comprises the transformation of the organizational set-up of industry, as well as that supply of enterprises, of the distribution of industrial products and of financing.¹⁴⁰

As the "conspiracy" of the Uralian capitalists is disclosed already in December 1917, most of the organizational threads tying the Ural region to the capital are successfully cut at once by closing the offices directing the industry in the Urals from Petrograd. As a result, all industrial enterprises working in the four governorships in the Urals come under the supervision of the regional Sovnarkhoz /Council of the National Economy/, which is acting as the economic section of the executive committee of the regional Soviet. The - elected - organs of the plant and district industrial management are similarly subordinated to the regional Council of the National Economy and to the "production plan" adopted by it "just as they were earlier to the administration centre residing in Piter".¹⁴¹

The regional Sovnarkhoz may order further nationalization in the districts "in the interest of the organization and planned regulation of production at any time; the participants of the Soviet congress demand that the Council of People's Commissars should pass the affairs of the former Petrograd centre to the regional apparatus; even the production conferences, having

their sessions at least every three months and consisting of the representatives of the plants, are responsible /as supreme "self-governing" institutions/ to the regional Soviet. No wonder if this kind of regional centralization demands the setting up of local "ministries": it is in this way that People's Commissariats of finance, production, labour, exchange /trade/, forestry and agriculture are planned to come into being in the Urals.¹⁴²

The same Soviet congress also orders the establishment "of a single supply department regulating the economic life of the region." It is into this department that the existing supply organs are merged. They perform their former activities now on the basis of the "comprehensive supply plan of the Urals" both in procurement and distribution. Of course, under the "strictest discipline", because the department will, in the future, punish all "separatist" actions opposed to the plan. And that everybody should well understand it: "... not a single pud of metal or other product can leave the factory without the permission of the supply department. No product of any kind can be exchanged for grain without the permission of the supply department... Not a single supply organ has the right to change the price of grain or other products without the order of the supply department", etc. - sounds the thundering resolution.¹⁴³

In financial matters, however, seemingly more moderate requirements will also do: no attempt is made to press own - Uralian - money; it is emphasized instead that the individual governorships should have a share in the monetary funds, to be heavily concentrated on a national level, according to the budgetary quota submitted by them. The resolution of the Soviet congress of the Urals wishes to promote "the weakening of the

power of money as such" primarily by the creation of the monopoly position of the People's Bank replacing the State Bank. In other words, by establishing a single, and hierarchically organized financial apparatus, which, broken down to plants, also performs inter-enterprise accounting.¹⁴⁴

Let us confess, there is something strange in the above demands: in the management, representing communist /naturalist/ principles, of production and distribution the regional aspect is much more stressed than in finances, desired to be abolished sooner or later, where the central element gains predominance. One cannot tell to what extent Preobrazhensky agrees with each of the above resolutions, but we could see ourselves how strongly he defends them as a local party leader and "left communist". In the process of communisation however, he will have a few surprises.

2.3.3. Centralization and bureaucracy.

Preobrazhensky may be astonished by, firstly, the reproduction of the centre-region conflict, hardly expected under Soviet circumstances, in industrial management; secondly, by the bureaucratic attitude of the new Soviet apparatus hardly to be excused merely by tsarist heritage; and thirdly, by the recognition of the fact that regional interest may be conflicting not only with the central one, but may also clash with the revolutionary objectives professed by him. The first dilemma will only partly be resolved by the general radicalization of Bolshevik policy following the outbreak of the Civil War, which will presumably make the advantage of the Uralians in the revolutionary rush disappear.

As regards Soviet bureaucracy, Preobrazhensky wages a relentless war with chinovnichestvo all his life.

Finally, the third problem, which he must face when studying the materials of the first controversies on the establishment of the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine¹⁴⁵ to put it simply: strategic large investment for the long-term defence of Soviet power as local interest, or the immediate mobilization of the resources to be tied up here for the purposes of a revolutionary war/ accompanies him to Moscow. True, from there things will be viewed from a different angle.

The state capitalism versus left-wing /or as they call it themselves: "proletarian"/ communism debate will be set aside for a while by the Civil War, but on the desirable proportions of centralization and decentralization Preobrazhensky has to decide day by day whether he writes an article on the management of agriculture, on the organizational structure of the army or on the machinery of party and state propaganda. In August 1919, he still announces firmly: "... the decentralization of our economic and Soviet apparatus is indispensable",¹⁴⁶ but later on he usually drops the subject. He will be interested rather in the questions of how the party should be directed, and his responses will also testify to a more centralist attitude.

In the matter of the new Soviet bureaucracy he does not come to heretic conclusions either. As regards the state apparatus, he professes the same view at the end of 1918 as in the spring of 1921: "... our clerks are working not only little, badly, sometimes nothing at all, but they do not even know how they should..." It is here that Preobrazhensky - in a way not typical of him - is pouring out recommendations for administrative penalties /reducing of personnel, forcing employees to do manual work, lengthening of the working time, etc./. Let us break, he says, with the situation, in which "with the

passing of time, our state apparatus is increasingly becoming a kind of recreation home, a social security organ for those who are suffering from the October revolution."¹⁴⁷

2.3.4. From the organization of industry to its reconstruction

While Preobrazhensky is not able to regard bureaucracy as an organic characteristic of Soviet industrial management even on the eve of the NEP either, he will no longer consider the complete naturalization of industry as such in the autumn of 1920, when he devotes more attention to industry with the interest of a financial economist. The initial naive textbook-phrases begin to be replaced by formulations of Realpolitik on the pages of The ABC of Communism in this context, too, Preobrazhensky, following the modifications of Bolshevik tactics, turns, in the autumn of 1919, not merely to the middle-peasant, but also to handicraft and small trade, which, even if the author does not draw the final conclusions yet, will appreciably repaint the picture he had in his mind of the organization of industry.

For industry appears to him more and more in its entire economic environment. It will be increasingly clear to Preobrazhensky that commodity relations within the state sector can be eliminated - if at all - only in proportion to the increase in production. The quantity of foodstuffs delivered by the peasantry and the output of the consumer industries are for the time being too small for the naturalization of wages, therefore the distribution of the industrial goods produced cannot be sufficiently centralized either. There remains the individualized system of exchange in kind with its black-market implications: factory food

detachments /organized bagging/, or paying the workers with the product of the enterprise, etc. The minimum precondition for the centralization of production would be - thinks Preobrazhensky - production itself, but it is, for the time being, - disregarding the supply of the army - largely limited to small-scale and kustar industry still unsuitable for naturalization and centralization.¹⁴⁸

Individual barter, the militarization of large-scale industry and the nationalization of small-scale industry do not replace, in Preobrazhensky's view, the communist ideal of centralized planned economy. The emergency solutions of the Civil War do not satisfy him /his persistence is imitated by not too many/, he searches instead for a way-out, which, through the maintenance of natural-hierarchic organization, leads to a really workable large-scale state industry. It is in this way that the task of the organization of industry passes, in his mind, into stressing the need for the reconstruction of industry, or into constructing a growth model already mentioned, a model, which starts with the development of heavy industry.

After this, not much would be needed, in principle, for Preobrazhensky, when meditating on the fate of state industry, to draw a conclusion, which appeared to him simple almost from the outset, concerning private peasant farming. To put it more simply: the market must be allowed to enter, to a certain extent, the socialist sector, or the informal commodity relations, existing there anyway, must be legalized. Yet how difficult it is to take such a decision is sufficiently proved by the history of socialist economic thought up to our days. Preobrazhensky himself even as a future propagator of khozraschet, will not think over the above postulate with theoretical consistency. Nevertheless, he will approach, and, already in his allegedly "war communist" stage, occasionally

also transgress the limit up to which a Bolshevik theoretician, educated in the Second International, could venture to proceed at all when answering the question of the reconcilability of commodity production and socialism.

Is it really possible to maintain the centralist-natural organization of industry, when efficiency is beginning to become the primary goal? Preobrazhensky's answer, as it appears at first sight, moves in the usual ambiguity: let us preserve the image of the /possibly near/ communist future in this case, too, but not without talking objectively about the present of the transition period. "Every worker... will take part personally in drawing up the comprehensive plan of production, or will have at least a completely clear picture of it" - he writes in the "ABC".¹⁴⁹ On the occasion of the first Week of the Peasant, he signs the praise of "the /central/ distribution of labour in the interest of the economy as a whole", and in November 1920, while expounding the so-called propaganda of production, he is daydreaming about the old communist idea of the "common kettle" even under socialist circumstances.¹⁵⁰ He speaks about the kettle into which all products will be thrown and from which the members of society can take more only if their performances are higher. But as soon as Preobrazhensky comes to face the demands of everyday life, he calls the elaboration of a single plan of the national economy with some reservation "experimental in character";¹⁵¹ he holds, for example, "revolutionary mobilization" in the case of the railways to be viable - arguing with Lenin - only against differential material rewards; and he calls on the working class "to be reconciled to inequality" stemming from the momentary order of importance in the prevailing shortage of foodstuffs.¹⁵²

2.3.5. With or without money?

Although he more or less agrees with the planned abolition of monetary accounting within the state sector, his arguments compared with those of a really faithful "naturalist" appear to be very unimaginative. Moreover, and this is why I spoke earlier of strange theoretical reservations of Preobrazhensky, the Marxist, he recognizes part of the logical problems deriving from the simultaneous implementation of centralization and naturalization, and plays, for a time, with the idea of limited monetary circulation, named "the exchange of talons"¹⁵³, indulging in reveries even about the future communist economy. And if we add on what a wide surface the concepts of centralization and bureaucratization are related to one another in his perception, and therefore how painful /and hardly final/ it will be for him to renounce the decentralized commune system in favour of centralized planned economy, then not only the "war" but sometimes even the "communist" colours of the portrait of the "other" Preobrazhensky will be dimmed in our eyes.

"The abolition of the whole system of the paper money circulation... can be ordered only by a government which has the possibility to have access to revenue in another way" - sounds, by my opinion, the key sentence of his first theoretical study in economics, The Paper Money...¹⁵⁴. As long as taxation in kind /in the form, for example, of requisitioning/ does not cover the expenses of the state budget, the incomes - primarily those of the peasants - have to be tapped by means of inflation. And if this path proves to be no longer viable, we should not refrain from the partial stabiliz-

zation of the monetary system either. From a monetary reform, where the proportions of the new - "hard" - prices are determined on the basis /sic!/ of the prices of the much hated "free-market morass".¹⁵⁵

The resurrection of money, which has completely lost its value, within the state sector would be of no use - this is the idea of Preobrazhensky that posterity regularly interprets as an ideological guiding principle rather than a pragmatic secondary motif. True, Preobrazhensky often speaks at length of the dying out of money, of the complete bankruptcy of the monetary system, and breathes a prayer for the printing press producing money of less and less value. But already in the introductory part of his study he lays down: the printing press is nothing else but a means, "a source of financing the revolution." For the printing press called by him, in a lofty manner, "the machine gun of the People's Commissariat of Finance" multiplies the paper money "which maintains the new power in the hardest period of its existence, when it has no possibility to cover the expenses of the Civil War by direct taxation."¹⁵⁶

The state sector needs money as long as it can purchase goods for it directly /in the market of raw materials/ or indirectly /through wages/. Will therefore - we might ask - even the formal preservation of monetary accounting within large-scale industry have no longer any sense as soon as inflating Soviet money comes up against the boycott of peasants, or the expenses of issuing money reach the level of inflation incomes? Of course, it has not - would Preobrazhensky nod his assent if he were really fascinated by money-

less economy. Instead, his answer is a negative one. Some of his arguments are of a practical nature. The foreign trade, the exchange between the kustar and the peasant and mainly the necessarily only partial naturalization of industrial wages will require money for quite a long time yet. A kind of "receipt" is also needed that the state will give to the peasants as an acknowledgement of its debts in the period of primitive accumulation. In addition, some means of payment will also be necessary so that the state will also be able to set the price of the services consumed by the village.¹⁵⁷

2.3.6. The constraints of naturalization

Why should we not interpret all this simply as an inevitable consequence of the emergency measures forcibly imposed, from outside and temporarily, on the state sector in the period of transition? Primarily not, because Preobrazhensky, although his practical approach to the survival of finances makes him conspicuously differ from the innumerable Bolshevik theoreticians and politicians hoping for the immediate dying-out of money /see his debate with Larin/¹⁵⁸ risks even more in his theoretical argumentation. Let us see what components he chooses: period of transition - stable currency to supplement distribution in kind - workers buy in the free market to meet their secondary needs. And how does he justify this choice? "The advantage of this method would be that it makes superfluous the clumsy apparatus administering the deliveries of secondary ... products and their distribution and frees the satisfaction of needs from bureaucratic handling, and makes the individualization of the satisfaction of needs possible."¹⁵⁹

Preobrazhensky takes the original Marxian requirements relating to the ever freer and richer satisfaction of individual needs so seriously /in relation to the entire socialist period of transition/ that he is unable to conceive, without a general means of exchange, the central-subsistence-economy of the future either. And not only in the circulation of secondary goods. For a summary, let us refer here to Preobrazhensky's version of the utopia of the "talon-exchange", not unknown already at the turn of century. Perhaps this will also count as much as the declarations of "Evgenii the Terrible", which include the merciless ousting of "commodities" by "products" or "the forcing of the free market and of the independent commodity producer into a blind alley."¹⁶⁰

"The naturalization of wages and the introduction of labour books, on the basis of which the workers and employees of the socialist state will receive the necessary products from the state, and the institutionalization of the accounting books of the peasants delivering their surpluses to the state and getting industrial goods in return will not make unnecessary the introduction of specific short-term accounting tickets in the form of cheques or talons. These tickets will probably have to be introduced for the easing of distribution, so that every worker-consumer can get the necessary quantity of products under consideration of his individual preferences. Let us assume that in the storehouses of the state cooperatives /sic!/ textiles, shoes, sweets, toys are available for distribution, and every worker can go to the theatre once every month on average, and so on. If for these products and entertainments talons /tickets/ are issued, one man prefers to get one more pound of sugar, the other one

more arshin of textile, the third would like to go to the theatre not once but twice a month instead of taking all foodstuffs for his talons, the fourth would willingly yield his seat in the theatre to somebody for a dozen eggs, the fifth would want to have two puds of apples from the peasant instead of making his claim for a pair of shoes, etc. This kind of exchange of talons among the consumers neither changes the distribution system itself at all, nor the quantity of products available for distribution, it gives, however, appropriate room for the manifold satisfaction of individual needs. Therefore, the issuing of such cheques or talons, whether with the indication of products available against them ^{or} only with the indication of the labour value of the talon, ... is absolutely necessary in the very long period in which the socialist society is not yet in a position to give its workers all that they need."¹⁶¹

Here is a Bolshevik, who has doubts about the absolute power of naturalization and whose reservations are likely to be explained by the illegal exchange relations established within the rationing system of the Civil War period. He is not engaged in examining the economic problems of the commensurability of goods in kind, as he apparently trusts in the feasibility of the determination of the "natural" labour-values /although, in contrast to many economists of his time, he does not patch up any labour-equivalents/. Therefore he does not feel the need to analyse, within the production sphere either, whether it is possible to combine the factors of production efficiently if we know only their parameters in kind. At any rate, by his proposal to carry out some decentralization of exchange, he willy-nilly also makes the idea of perfect centra-

lization questionable.

Thus the announcement of the New Economic Policy does not find Preobrazhensky completely unprepared, not only in agrarian policy, but also in financial matters and partly in economic theory, too. He suggests a limited monetary reform, does not ~~subbornly~~ insist on state revenues being covered by requisitioning and is also ideologically "relaxed": in his vision of communism naturalization and centralization are no longer taboos for him. All this characterizes him exactly at the moment when the NEP is born. That is at the X Congress, when he, as one of the first "revisionists", runs through, in his mind, all the expected economic consequences of the introduction of food tax. What is more, he does so, in the awareness of the sure and painful fact that even the slightest liberalization of the agricultural market may "undermine the basis /large-scale state industry/, on which the Soviet Republic rests."¹⁶²

2.4. "Etatization" and local patriotism

Thus the market is, to a certain extent, indispensable, but to prevent that it should jeopardize the achievements of the revolution - Preobrazhensky thinks - it is necessary to take cautious counter-measures. Slogans like "subordination of the market", "let us struggle against the market with the laws of the market" repeatedly appear in his writings, for example, when he meditates on inflation.¹⁶³ He does not call it market regulation, and organized market, and does not speak as yet of the functioning of the law of value, nevertheless he assumes, in the long run, a kind of regular, not completely naturalized exchange relation /at "hard" prices/ primarily between industry and agriculture. Instead of the SR-

-sounding concept of free market, which he contemptuously considers as a synonym of the black market. He is, of course, basically barter-oriented, but is, at the same time, representing the idea of state-organized exchange: he rejects all forms of bagging, but is in favour of regular exchange of labour /of the mobilization of urban workers to perform rural seasonal work, of the establishment of machine stations under the supervision of the state industry, etc./.¹⁶⁴

This "organization" of the market is safeguarded, in Preobrazhensky's argumentation, by firm state monopolies /grain, banking, trade, transport, industry/ and by the possibility of several smaller or larger state interventions. It appears, he risks entering the world of the New Economic Policy trusting in this guarantees.¹⁶⁵ This indicates at the same time that by the end of the Civil War Preobrazhensky has preserved very little of his decentralist views, at least in matters of the economy. From a "regional communist" he is increasingly becoming a "government Bolshevik". For the communism of the commune state evolves more and more a central /state/ communism in his ideological development.

I cannot undertake to keep track here of this metamorphosis, the main causes of the intellectual changes are anyway hidden largely in the intricacies of internal party policy hardly possible to disentangle here /the rise and fall of the pressure group in the Urals, Preobrazhensky's rapid inclusion in and exclusion from the secretariat of the Central Committee, the trade-union controversy, differences of opinion concerning party democracy, professionalization of the party apparatus, Trotsky's ambiguous influence, etc./. But since I have already often taken resort, in my argumentation, to the "centralization" of Preobrazhensky's way of thinking

/I have also made mention of his sense of responsibility for the whole nation, and of his supercilious-reprimanding way of behaviour/, I cannot leave this thread untied. For a conclusion here are some "knots" from this thread:

/1/ Exchange in kind among agricultural communes as the germ of socialism; the gradual unification of consumer cooperatives and trade unions, that is, of distribution and production, while "the function of the state is limited to that of a central accounting office"; "state-cooperative" storehouses for the organization of local distribution - similar phrases may be quoted en masse from Preobrazhensky's works written in 1919/1920, in order to illustrate that it is not easy for him to get rid of the traditional vision of decentralized commune-system.¹⁶⁶

/2/ In his theoretical deliberations, however, the socialist state as a centralized and hierarchic organ of professional administration comes to play an essential role. He attributes more and more importance to professional knowledge and rational administration. Although the theoretical model is presumably inspired by his party experiences /first of all by his daily struggles with the difficulties of the party developing into a mass organization, and with the lack of his subordinates' professional culture/, Preobrazhensky transforms his former view of the conflict of the "verkhi" and of the "nizi" /upper and lower level organizations and leaders/ also in the context of state management.

He moves in a centripetal direction, but never becomes - at least according to the military interpretation of that time - a real centralist. Not even in the course of the trade-union controversy when, finally

joining forces with Trotsky, he vigorously emphasizes the demand for the establishment of a stable, centralized state apparatus. For Preobrazhensky - together with his comrades from the so-called "buffer group" - gives his support to the platform demanding the "statization" of the trade unions only when its militarist-centralist edge /Tsektran labour armies, etc./ is, to some degree, taken off. Large-scale industry, mass production and concentration remain, of course, important values for him, and, what is more, they are now associated not only with the non-recurrent concept of nationalization /natsionalizatsia/, but also with the continuous concept of statization /ogosudarstvlenie/.¹⁶⁷

/3/ He also speaks of the statization of party work /as of "an absolutely progressive" development/. He regards this process in another respect as the "communization of the state". Preobrazhensky's aim is to rationalize party life: to make the recruitment and the regrouping of the cadres more organized, to construct a uniform program of agitation and to optimize the organization of the Central Committee. All this is tantamount to the take-over of the management techniques of modern large-scale industry and the state, or to assigning several tasks, "expropriated" earlier by the party, again to the state apparatus.¹⁶⁸ These changes should be carried out, of course, without diminishing the hegemony of the Bolshevik party. It is in this spirit that at the IX Congress Preobrazhensky instructs the decemist Sapronov about the higher rank of the party congress compared with that of the Soviet congress.¹⁶⁹ Also in 1920, at the IX Conference he gives a lecture to Lutovinov, belonging to the Workers' Opposition, of how necessary and, unfortunately, how limited the interventions of the CC are in the activities of the leading state organs.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, he accuses at

the X Congress in 1921, Lunacharskii "departamental imperialism" in the debate on the scope of authority of Glavpolitprosvet /the Centre of Political Education/, supervised by Preobrazhensky, and protects the - "non-etatizable" - prerogative of the party /and partly of his own/ against the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment in determining the basic principles of Marxian theory and propaganda.¹⁷¹

/4/ In the "verkhi" - "nizi" debate the phenomena of bureaucracy within the party and the state do not seem to be separable to him either. But while in the debate on party democracy the change of roles from the old "oblastnik" /regional functionary/ into "tsekist" or "tsekovets" /member of the CC apparatus/ is unambiguous even terminologically, in the controversy over regional economic centres, he sticks, even if not to his "sound" decentralism brought from the Urals, but at least to giving voice to the advantages of local patriotism.¹⁷²

Maybe, Preobrazhensky as a member of the CC secretary-trio is really more indulgent in suffering groupings within the party than either Stasova preceding them in the job /she was nicknamed "Absolute" in illegality/ or the Molotov-led trio following them. It is also likely that he is less military-like in moving the cadres here and there and appointing them from above. At the same time, he quickly forgets, between March and September 1920, the anyway rather mild slogan formulated by him at the IX Congress about "some decentralization of the power of the Central Committee", For at the IX Conference held in the autumn, he as a CC secretary appointed a few months before, is already more inclined to discuss the new organizational measures of the Central Committee /the brand-new plan for the redistribution of cadres the setting up of moral courts of justice, etc./ than to praise those local

organizations which "do not always wait for central guidance", but have the courage to act independently.¹⁷³ The demand from below for a partial division of power, which helped, among other things, Preobrazhensky to be appointed secretary at the IX Congress in order to pacify those who were dissatisfied with the militarist methods of the secretariat of the CC, at the IX Conference already appears in the opposite form. Preobrazhensky represents here the usual claim of the centre to set things in order from above: "sometimes it is necessary to take steps even against certain strata of the proletariat", against those "who have lost their heads" - he says sadly.¹⁷⁴

/5/ Only local patriotism? Is that all that has remained of his Uralian pride of "we have got further on"? One thing is clear: this haughtiness will give place, as soon as he comes to Moscow, to the aristocratic pride of being an "old Bolshevik".¹⁷⁵ Yet, his last statement before the introduction of the NEP /at the IX Congress/ on the desirable organization of state economic management, still discloses much of the past of the former "oblastnik".

"All - including the Central Committee - is getting definitely bureaucratized" - fulminates Preobrazhensky, but the "ulcer" of bureaucracy, as he calls it elsewhere, is primarily a consequence of the infection named Civil War. Those who blame the central organs for it /i.e. the decemists/ are similarly - and rightfully, as he thinks - criticized by their subordinates from the governorships, districts etc.¹⁷⁶ Here is the first serious example of the relativization of the significance of the regional level /oblast'/ in Preobrazhensky's thinking. In the tug of war about the regional economic centres he ironically emphasizes - as he says - his impartial /"non-party"/ communist attitude. And really, while, on

the one hand, he takes for indispensable that these centres "should be given full powers in making decisions on issues of an indisputably economic character", on the other hand, he readily admits that regional centralization often cannot be justified from economic aspects. It sometimes only inserts an unnecessary intermediate step in the relations of governorships with the government. Of course not in the Urals or Siberia, which are regions far away from the capital.¹⁷⁷

The regional organs can be set up in such a way that "the central authorities send there their own representatives with full powers, with extraordinarily full powers, or perhaps with excessively full powers - says Preobrazhensky mockingly. But also in a way "as we did earlier, when there still existed... proletarian democracy in our country" - he adds full of nostalgia. But he recommends, as if he got frightened of indulging in reveries in the recent past, instead of an election from below, parity committees, consisting of the representatives of the centre and the governorships, to direct the regional centres. The way he continues is also surprising: "In this connection, I am most resolutely opposed to the establishment of such regional Soviets of the National Economy as were recently set up by the council of the labour army in the Urals. The trouble is that the council of the labour army is gradually transformed into an economic organ and acquires step by step, but irresistibly, full powers in other oblasti, too.¹⁷⁸

This is how the glory of the world passes away. "The "Ural'skaia Trudovaia Kommuna" in 1918 is all right, but the quasi-republic created by the labour army in 1920 is not? Perhaps Preobrazhensky sees clearly how he gives lie to earlier himself, and it is possibly for that reason that he concludes his train of thoughts

by substituting the pejorative concept of oblastnichestvo for local patriotism. If the regions implement the central instructions completely, why should we shrink back from exploiting the local energies by refreshing the spirit of regional competition? - he asks with the remaining courage of the one-time provocatively pro-regional Bolshevik.

"If any delegate from Petrograd, participating in the Congress, when walking in the courtyard of the Kremlin, can proudly say that even the last street in Petrograd is much cleaner than that.

This pride is due to the fact that patriotism in Petrograd is entirely put into the service of the construction of communism. If at home // in the Urals there are old comrades among the workers who are inseparably united by their struggle against capital; if a competitive spirit can be observed in carrying out requisitioning or in perfecting the organization, then why should not we put also this kind of oblastnichestvo into the service of the construction of communism?"¹⁷⁹

/6/ This text inspired by the vanguard-spirit of the Urals, tamed to local patriotism, is, by the way, not Preobrazhensky's last word in the subject. For the anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist movements, gaining ground again at the turn of the years 1920 and 1921 outside and within the party, infuriate not only the Bolshevik politician in him, /he was never enthusiastic about external political competition, and now at the X Congress, he gives his vote even for the ban on factionalism within the party with a view to silencing the Workers' Opposition, but also one of the leading theoreticians of the party. Because great passions are needed for him, in the busy time of the transition

to NEP, to rewrite and also to publish soon after the Congress his study Anarchism and Communism, the first draft of which was written in 1918.¹⁸⁰ It is in this work that he consigns to oblivion the vision of the commune state, branding it as a petty-bourgeois utopia. And he who does it, is Preobrazhensky who, as one of the originators of the idea, conceives at that time even the Komintern as "the international conference of the councils of workers' deputies and of all 'independent' organizations of the proletariat."¹⁸¹

And that this farewell is devoid of the tears of self-pity, is due to a new intellectual flirt, /it is perhaps unbelievable/ to a liaison between Preobrazhensky and the NEP.

EPILOGUE

The "other" Preobrazhensky? Why, what is the "first" like? - I put these questions right at the beginning of my study. What is that particular "other" Preobrazhensky like? - the reader might ask me now, justly longing for unanimity. "Tell me now at last fair and square, is this Evgenii really the Terrible, or is he not? Which of them is the real one, and is there a real one at all? Or is it exactly this ambiguous soul in which the truth lies?"

I might evade the answer in either of two ways. I might say, first, that the only honest way to state anything seriously about him opens after the presentation of his whole life-work. Secondly, that it is only by means of a kind of "dialectical" intermingling of the "first" and the "second" Preobrazhenskys that we can arrive at a satisfactory solution, leaving it to the discretion of the reader to decide on the ratios of the individual components. The fact that I do not evade the answer right away, does not mean, however, that I am able now to answer the questions raised.

For I might describe Preobrazhensky /also on the basis of his allegedly "war-communist" period outlined here/ as a politician and theoretician, who can be characterized by such high-flown epithets as "soft", "liberal", "moderate", "decentralist". These attributes, however, would have a sense only in the context of their established counterparts. Unless we leave out of consideration the "first" Preobrazhensky and drop the concepts used there /radical, centralist, industrializer, war communist, etc./ we have really no choice: we may meditate over the internal proportions of the conflicting designations /he is more radical in this, more moderate in that, more centralist now, less decentralist then, etc./

My writing - however its polemic tone might suggest - sets "one" portrait against the "other" not primarily with a view to redistribute Preobrazhensky's characteristics in the spirit of complementarity. No, the logical operation of confrontation serves, in essence, didactic purposes. For I should like to demonstrate that an alternative interpretation of the age would be needed since an appreciable proportion of the historical facts disclosed contradicts the approach which has played a dominant role until now, or very often even diametrically opposed statements can be supported by them.

Hence, what I am suggesting is not that we replace the "first" Preobrazhensky by his opposite self, although I am convinced that, with many of his characteristics, we would not make a blunder by doing so. I would not approve either if we were satisfied with the model of a "double-soul" Preobrazhensky, which would easily explain everything, although this method is related at several points, to what has been said above. I would rather recommend the fundamental rearrangement of the "first" portrait according to new concepts. Thus the "other" portrait will not be a mere negative of the "first" one, that can be seen on the cover of this study, but it will be another kind of portrait in the strict sense of the word.

Another in what? "Mid-left-sidedness", "regional communism", realistic agrarian policy, limited "naturalism", etc. - and I could go on listing the tentative concepts I have used, often for lack of more suitable ones, in the second part alone of my study. Whether the categories I have put to the test in analyzing this arbitrarily chosen period of Preobrazhensky's life would prove to be feasible also in drawing the arch spanning the whole period from 1917 until

1937, is a question not reassuringly settled even for myself. But reassuringly to the extent that I would take it amiss if you, good reader, putting down my study, turned to me sceptically with the words of the prophet Jeremiah: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin and the leopard his spots?"

ANNEX: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORKS OF E.A.PREOBRAZHENSKY

The list below contains nearly all of Preobrazhensky's works predominantly in Russian, that can be found in a printed form. I am trying to present more than the only serious bibliographical undertaking known heretofore /Filtzer^{x/} 1980, 40 titles/ by listing not only the author's studies and books, but also his newspaper articles - often of the volume and level of a study - as well as his public speeches and contributions /thus the number of the listed items amounts to 411/. In my view, this kind of documentation of the roles of the politician, publicist and debater characterizes any Bolshevik social scientist of the time more faithfully than the focusing of attention merely on scholarly works in their strict sense. /It is for this reason that I have included in the bibliography some circular letters of Preobrazhensky issued in his capacity of CC secretary, and even some of his samizdat writings known until now only by their titles, as well as his letters sent to Trotsky and his comrades in the Opposition during his exile in 1928/29./

The list contains exclusively works published between 1917 and 1936 as I have only indirect information about Preobrazhensky's literary activity before 1917. The written materials of his illegal party work before and after 1917, are preserved in archives inaccessible to me, and the overwhelming majority of his legal publications in the Russian countryside have got lost, and were anyway often anonymous.

x/ I owe special thanks to Jenny Brine and Don Filtzer, who gave me assistance in collecting Preobrazhensky's works not available in Europe.

Finally, the bibliography is only nearly complete also because, however persistently I have tried in the course of many years of research work to chase up Preobrazhensky materials in the specialized literature and daily press of the twenties and the thirties, some writings of the fanatically prolific author are sure to have escaped my attention, not to speak of the state of local libraries and of the poor quality of the paper used for printing.

x x x

The works of Preobrazhensky have been divided into three groups: 1. works in Russian, which are available in libraries; 2. works not available, which are known only from references; 3. works in English, German and French /mostly re-editions/. In the first group the titles are arranged in a yearly breakdown: in the first place there are those works, which could be dated exactly /some dates were corrected according to the new style/, then comes the rest of Preobrazhensky's writings/articles in periodicals, books etc./ I put a question mark where the reference is missing or unreliable. The number of pages is not indicated.

List of abbreviations:

II. and E.II. = Preobrazhensky E.A.

T = The Trotsky Archives /unpublished materials, Houghton Library, Harvard University/

BKA = Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii

BCA = Vestnik Sotsialisticheskoi Akademii

BAII = Vestnik Agitatsii i Propagandy

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NOTES

My dissertation contains a special chapter on the historiography of Preobrazhensky-interpretations. Thus it did not make sense to go into details here. That is why . I only indicate, without comments, some characteristic works of sovietological literature in the notes, and, instead of speaking of Preobrazhensky, I rather let Preobrazhensky speak himself.

When quoting his works, I give only their short titles, the years of publication and the page numbers where it is necessary. For further details, see the Bibliography in the Annex. All italics in the quotations are mine.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. See, for example Deutscher's Trotsky trilogy or the introductions of Mandel or Naville to the French edition of *The New Economics*; for an interpretation of Preobrazhensky's works in the light of growth theory, see, for example Erlich's Soviet Industrialization Debate; about unequal exchange, see, for example the works of Emmanuel, Amin or Sau.
2. See, for example, The IX and X Chapters of the "Short Course". For current interpretation, see, for example, the VII-X Chapters of *Istoriia politicheskoi ekonomii sotsializma* /red. Trifonov and Shirokograd/, Leningrad, 1983.
3. See my studies "Gazdasági intézmények történelmi/etlen/ párhuzamai. A NEP és a magyar gazdasági reform." A KTI Közleményei, Budapest 1982. / /A/historical parallels of economic institutions. The NEP and the NEM/ and "Az elfelejtett konszenzus. A Preobrazsenszkij-Buharin vita ujraértékeléséhez, Medvetánc, Budapest 1982/2-3./The forgotten consensus. The Preobrazhensky-Bukharin controversy revisited./
4. See Note No 1
5. See the bibliography in the Annex
6. These features of the "other" Preobrazhensky are portrayed in the subsequent chapters of my dissertation.

7. See Note No 4
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9. C.f. Gazdasági intézmények...
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11. Bukharin /=B/: Novoie otkrovenie o sovetskoi ekonomike..., pp 14-15
12. P and B: Azbuka Kommunizma /The ABC of Communism, Penguin 1969/
13. See Notes Nos 1,2,8; C.Bettelheim: Les luttes de classes en URSS, 2. 1923-1930, Paris 1977; E.H.Carr: A History of Soviet Russia. Socialism in One Country 1924-1926.I, Penguin 1970.; S.F.Cohen: Bukharin, Lenin and the Theoretical Foundations of Bolshevism, Soviet Studies 1970/4; S.F.Cohen: Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, N.Y. 1973; R.B.Day: Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation, Cambridge 1973; R.V. Daniels: The Conscience of the Revolution, Cambridge, 1960; R.B.Day: Preobrazhensky and the Theory of the Transition Period, Soviet Studies 1975/2; Trotsky and Preobrazhensky, Studies in Comparative Communism 1977/1-2; I.Deutscher: Stalin, Penguin 1966; Trotsky. The Prophet Unarmed, London 1959; M.Dobb: The Discussion of the Twenties on Planning... Soviet Studies 1965.Oct.; Soviet Economic Development since 1917, London 1948; A.Erlich: Preobrazhensky and the Economics of Soviet Industrialization, QJE 1950/1; The Soviet Industrialization Debate, Cambridge 1960; D.Filtzer: Preobrazhensky and the Problem of Soviet Transition, Critique No 9; S.Heitman Between Lenin and Stalin/in: Revisionism, N.Y.1962/; The Path to Socialism in Russia, Introduction, N.Y. 1967; P.Knirsch: Die Ökonomischen Anschauungen N.I. Bucharins, Berlin 1959. M.Lewin: Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates, Princeton 1974; A.G.Löwy: Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht, Wien 1969; A. Nove: Intoducton to the New Economics, Oxford 1965; An Economic History of the USSR, Penguin 1969; L. Schapiro: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N.Y 1960; N.Spulber: Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth, Bloomington 1964 E.H.Carr: Introduction to The ABC of Communism, Penguin 1969

14. Ibid.
15. B: Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda, M.1920
16. P: Bumazhnye den'gi v epokhu proletarskoi diktatury, M.1920
17. See Note No 13
18. See, for example, the works of Cohen, Lewin and Nove quoted in Note No 13.
19. M.Lewin: op.cit. pp 33-37
20. For lack of space I neglected the the antecedents and the consequences of the debate, as well as those works which are not directly connected with the duel of P and B /the conflicts of their followers, the writings of P and B which are not addressed to each other, etc./.The polemics, in its strict sense, takes place in 8 stages:
P - lecture in the Communist Academy with the title "Osnovnoi zakon sotsialisticheskogo nakopleniya" /VKA 1924/VIII/
B - first response: Novoie otkroveniie o sovetskoi ekonomike ili kak mozhno pogubit' raboche-krestianskij blok? /Pravda 1924/12/12/; second response: "K kritike ekonomicheskoi platformy oppozitsii. Uroki oktiabria 1923g" /Bolshevik 1925/1, 1925/1/15/
P - response to B's two articles: "Eshche raz o sotsialisticheskem nakoplenii" /VKA 1925/XI/; lecture in the Communist Academy with the title "Zakon cennosti v sovetskem khoziaistve" /1926/1/21/, VKA 1926/14; publication of the "Novaia Ekonomika" in two editions in 1926 /2. Chapter contains, with slight modifications, the lecture "Osnovnoi...", 3. Chapter is identical with the lecture "Zakon...", in the Appendix P republishes "Eshche raz..."
B - response to the book of P: "K voprosu o zakonomernostiakh perekhodnogo perioda /Pravda, 1926/7/1,3,7/
P - response to B's series of articles: new introduction to the second edition of "Novaia Ekonomika"
The following quotations refer to these works. In the case of "Eshche raz..." I cite from the Appendix of the "Novaia Ekonomika"/first edition/
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22. B: Novoie..., pp 14-16; K kritike..., p 42; P: Eshche raz...pp 219-220, 236, 254-55

23. P: Osnovnoi..., pp 78, 92-93; B: Novoie..., pp 11-15, 15-18;
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24. P: Osnovnoi...p 59; Eshche raz...pp 241-242; B: Novoie...pp 20-25;
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25. P: Zakon cennosti...
26. B: K voprosu...
27. P: Osnovnoi...pp 92, 115; Predisloviie k vtoromu ...pp 14-23;
B: K voprosu...
28. P: Novaia Ekonomika, pp 40, 116-127; B: K voprosu...
29. B: Novoie...p 21; K kritike...p 29
30. P: Osnovnoi...pp 79-80; B: Novoie...pp 23-28
31. B: K kritike...p 28
32. P: Eshche raz...p 221
33. P: Ot NEPa k sotsializmu, 1922
34. P: Novaia Ekonomika, pp 116-127, 141-165; Eshche raz...pp 247-255
35. B: Novoie...p 21; P: Osnovnoi...p 99; Eshche raz...pp 223-224
36. P: Osnovnoi...p 78; B: K kritike...pp 30, 30-35, 51-52
37. P: Novaia Ekonomika, pp 126, 145-148
38. B: Zametki ekonomista k nachalu novogo khoziaistvennogo
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39. P: Novaia Ekonomika, pp 170-179
40. P: Eshche raz...pp 235-245
41. B: Zametki ekonomista...; P: Zakat kapitalizma, 1931; O metodolo-
gi sostavlenia..., 1931
42. B: Novoie...pp 15-18, 22-24; K kritike...pp 30-32, 41-42, 50-52;
P: Eshche raz...pp 235-245
43. P: Eshche raz...p 234; B: K kritike...pp 30-35
44. P: Novaia Ekonomika, pp 159-160
45. P: Eshche raz...pp 238-239; B: Novoie...pp 25-28; K kritike
pp 30-35, 39-47
46. P: Eshche raz...pp 211-213
47. P: Ibid. p 253

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

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49. See notes Nos 4, 6, 7
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52. S'ezd neobhodim, 1918
53. Rech na IX s'ezde RKP/b/, p 68; Deiateli SSSR i Oktiabr'-skoi revolutsii, t.II.,M.1925, p 131
54. Sredi druzheskoi pechati,1917; Spekuliatsiia na uchreditel'noie sobranie; Pugaiut sotsialismom; Azbuka zabytogo marksizma; Na putiakh otstuplenia; Ne govoria khudogo slova; Spasiteli kolchakov; Tozhe marksist, 1918
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121. Tsirkuliary, instruktsii, i polozheniia izdannyie TsK RKP za period mezhdu IX i X s''ezdami partii, *Izvestia* TsK RKP/b/ No 28, 1921/3/5, pp 8-10
122. Rech na IX Konferentsii, p 126
123. Nasha rabota, 1920
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128. O mobilizatsii..., 1920; Bumazhnye den'gi..., pp 48-69, 78-82
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132. *Ibid*.
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140. Rezolutsia III Ural'skogo oblastnogo s''ezda Sovetov po finansovomu voprosu, *ibid.*, pp 22-23; Postanovlenie III Ural'skogo oblastnogo s''ezda Sovetov ob organizatsii planovogo snabzheniia predpriatiy i raspredeleniia ikh produktsiy, Ural'skii Rabochii 1918/2/21
141. Zapiska Shliapnikovu, V.I.Lenin: Poln. Soch., t.50, p 16; Dekret Sovnarkoma o konfiskatsii..., *Izvestiia TsIK i Petrogradskogo Soveta*..., No 246, 1917/12/8; Soobshchenie o razoblachenii zagovora..., Ural'skii Rabochii, 1917/12/30; Instruktsiia..., pp 12-17
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146. Zametki, ..., 1919; Upravleniie sovetskimi..., 1919
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150. Pervye kirpichi, 1920; K proizvodstvennoi agitatsii i propagande. Novaia zadacha, 1920
151. Uchebnyi material dlia partsovshkol, VAP.3., 1920/11/25
152. K podniatiiu transporta, 1919
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154. Ibid. .p34.
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156. Ibid. pp 3-4
157. Ibid. pp 79-82
158. Ibid. pp 82
159. Ibid. p 80
160. Ibid. p 42
161. Ibid. pp 83-84
162. Rech na X s''ezde, p 428
163. Bumazhnye den'gi..., pp 34-48
164. Ibid. pp 68-69; Pervye Kirpichi, 1920; O chem govorit'..., 1920; Nashi zadachi v derevne, 1919
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166. V derevne. Ostrovki sotsializma, 1919; The ABC..., pp 384-385; Bumazhnye den'gi, p 83
167. O zadachakh i strukture profsoiuzov, 1921
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171. Rech na X s''ezde, pp 481-482
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173. Rech na IX s''ezde, p 68; Rech na IX Konferentsii pp 123-128, 172-174
174. Rech na IX Konferentsii, p 172
175. Rech na IX s''ezde, p 66; Rech na X s''ezde, pp 151, 483
176. Rech na IX s''ezde, p 67
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180. Anarkhizm...1921
181. K novym beregam, 1918